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INTRODUCTION

agree that gender' equality remains elusive; they disagree
about why. A critical question is whether gender equality can be
accomplished by treating men and women interchangeably. Stated another way, the debate2 has been between those who deny that women
need "special treatment" in order to achieve equality, and those who argue that "real" equality demands that the legal system recognize the
unique role which women play in society. Each side of this similar treatment/special treatment debate has assumed that the correct doctrinal
formulation of equality will lead to some form of "true equality."
This premise is misplaced. The debate has been about the wrong
question, because neither approach is capable of redressing the problems
women face. The values underlying any meaningful notion of gender
equality are incompatible with the basic limitations in the law's concept
of rights. The law's vision of discrimination, and indeed, of rights themselves, provides little support for the eradication of sexism.' An understanding of these limitations supports a critique of basic constitutional
norms, and the recognition that commonly accepted views of equality
foster an inherently unequal society.
This article will examine and critique the ways in which legal notions of discrimination and rights make demands for gender equality appear dissonant and even unjust. We begin by reviewing the similar
treatment/different treatment debate, and the caselaw that has influenced
EMINISTS

1. In this essay we use the words "sex" and "gender" interchangeably, for the reasons cited by
Professor MacKinnon. See C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987); MacKinnon, Not a
Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 321, 322 n.5 (1984).
2. Some of the works in the debate include Finley, TranscendingEquality Theory:A Way Out of
the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1986); Krieger & Cooney, The
Miller-Wohl Controversy: EqualTreatment, PositiveAction and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 513 (1983); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 955 (1984); Littleton, Equality and FeministLegal Theory, 48 U. PIrr. L. REV. 1043 (1987);
Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence,56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981); Williams, Equality's Riddle:
Pregnancyand the Equal Treatment/SpecialTreatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
325 (1984-85).
3. Many of the same limitations impede the law's ability to eradicate racism, classism and other
forms of discrimination. An extended discussion of these problems, however, is beyond the scope of
this Article. Instead, we use gender in this essay to illustrate the law's inability to redress the grievances of the powerless.
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it. After briefly discussing some of the values underlying true gender
equality, we examine how discrimination law fails to provide a means for
achieving such equality. In so doing, we explore the innate limitations of
discrimination law, and then observe those same limitations operating at
a more basic level in the very notion of constitutional rights. We conclude by discussing how current forms of legal reasoning prevent equality, and how a change in methodology holds forth some promise for
reducing gender inequality.
A.

The Caselaw Background

The first judicial response to constitutional claims of sex discrimination was Victorian. In the infamous case of Bradwell v. Illinois4, the
Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Myra Bradwell's license to practice
law due to her sex. In his oft-cited concurring opinion, Justice Bradley
relied on the natural roles of the sexes to justify the decision:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of men and women.... The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
The law of the Creator, however, soon gave way to the social
changes forged by industrialization and urbanization. 6 In a sense, the
modem debate about similar or different treatment began with the reformist goal of improving conditions in the workplace. Reformers often
attempted to achieve such goals by first improving the working conditions of women and children.7 In Muller v. Oregon,8 the Supreme Court
upheld a maximum hours statute which applied only to women on the
grounds that women needed special protection to ensure their health and
that of future generations.'
Muller was authority for treating women differently from men. As
time passed, however, such protective legislation became disabling rather
than protective because it limited the number of hours women could
work, the type of work they could do, and the conditions under which
4. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
5. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
6. See A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE EARNING WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES 45-72 (1983 ed.).
7. Id. at 180-95.
8. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
9. Id. at 421-23. The Supreme Court upheld the statute despite the fact that Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), struck down a maximum hours statute which applied to all workers as
violative of the due process clause and freedom of contract.
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they could labor.1" Protective legislation thus combined with other factors to perpetuate barriers to the employment of women.1 '
In the last twenty years, the women's movement has challenged
12
both protective legislation and discriminatory employment practices.
In an important early case, the Supreme Court discredited the notion
that men and women could be treated differently due to stereotypical
assumptions about their place in the world. Frontierov. Richardson 13 involved the constitutionality of providing spousal benefits to all wives of
men in the military, but requiring husbands of military personnel to
prove their dependency. The Secretary of Defense had defended the
scheme as efficient because wives are frequently dependent on their husbands, while husbands are rarely dependent on their wives. 14 The Court
rejected this argument as based on "gross, stereotyped distinctions"
which placed women in a subordinate position."a
Other cases followed Frontieroin rejecting classifications based on
outdated stereotyes. 16 The Court's approach to differential treatment between the sexes, however, was inconsistent. For example, in Kahn v.
Shevin, I7 the Court upheld a Florida statute which granted a property
tax exemption to widows, but not widowers, based on the "financial difficulties confronting the lone woman." 1 8 If a statute was seen as an attempt to rectify the effects of past gender discrimination, the Court was
10. See J. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION (1978); W.H. CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN:
HER CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ROLES, 1920-1970, 124-28 (1975 ed.); A.
KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 6, at 180-214.
11. See J. BAER, supra note 10, at 19-23; A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 6, at 181.
12. See J. BAER, supra note 10, at 136-74; W.H. CHAFE, supra note 10, at 233-34; A. KESSLERHARRIS, supra note 6, at 300-19; see also Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1223 (9th
Cir. 1971) (state protective labor legislation conflicts with Title VII's policy of non-discrimination);
BABCOCK, FREEDMAN, NORTON & Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 229-439 (1975 ed.)
(collecting cases).
13. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Notwithstanding the conclusion of the plurality opinion in Frontliero,a
majority of the Supreme Court has never denominated sex as a suspect classification for purposes of
equal protection clause analysis.
14. Id. at 688-89.
15. Id. at 685.
16. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (exclusion of men from
state nursing school tends to perpetuate stereotypes that nursing is a woman's job); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating Alabama alimony statute permitting alimony only to women and not
to men); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (striking down a similar provision of the Social
Security Act); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (invalidating statute providing longer age of
majority for female children than for male children for purposes of child support); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (denial of OASDI survivor benefits to widowers with children while
providing benefits to widows with children is unconstitutional).
17. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
18. Id. at 353.
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willing to uphold it as compensatory. 1 9
20
While there is much to be said in favor of compensatory statutes,
the Court failed to delineate a jurisprudence of gender bias. The cases
demonstrated a preoccupation with labeling, and offered only a limited
analysis of circumstances which might justify differential treatment.21
The Court was unable, or unwilling, to pierce through stereotypes and
examine those social assumptions about the sexes that are worthy of legal
recognition, and those that are not. Thus it should not be surprising that
the Court lacked any sustainable analytical approach when confronted
with cases that concerned differences between the sexes that were linked
to biology. Such differences, which arise primarily in the area of reproduction, seem more "real" and enduring than those faced in cases such as
Frontiero. And they have caused the Court, and feminists, far more
trouble.
The critical case was Geduldig v. Aiello 2 which involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a California disability insurance system
that specifically excluded pregnancy benefits. In an astonishing feat of
judicial legerdemain, the Court found that the system did not violate the
equal protection clause because there was: "no evidence in the record
that the selection of the risks insured by the program worked to discriminate against any definable group or class.... There is no risk from which
men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from
which women are protected and men are iot." 3
In the now infamous footnote 20, the Court explained that there was
no discrimination because the California program
merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities .... Normal pregnancy is an objectively identifiable
physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts... lavmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of
19. See id. at 355; see also Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding as compensatory
social security retirement benefits calculation that favored women); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.

498 (1975) (upholding rule providing women naval officers with longer period in which to receive
promotion prior to discharge due to fewer opportunities for promotion available to women).

20. See infra text accompanying notes 225-37.
21.

See infra text accompanying notes 201-12 for a further discussion of this issue.

22. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Another important case dealing with what the Court sees as real sex
differences is Michael M. v. Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). Michael M upheld California's

statutory rape law, on the ground that "realistically... the sexes are not similarly situated," and

"only women may become pregnant." Id. at 469, 471. For a powerful feminist analysis of Michael
M, see Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 Tax. L. Rav. 387 (1984).
23. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 496-97 (footnotes omitted).
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legislation such as this on any reasonable basis.2 4
Geduldig's distinction between discrimination against pregnancy
and discrimination on the basis of sex was extended to Title VII in GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert.2 5 The reaction to both cases was heated. Congress responded by enacting the Pregnancy Disability Act of 1978
("PDA"), which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196426
and provides in pertinent part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs,
as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability to work...27
The issues raised by Geduldig have not disappeared with the passage
of the PDA. The PDA made it clear that pregnant women could not be
denied disability leaves where such leaves were generally available. But
did that mean that pregnancy leaves were required? Or was it discriminatory against men to provide women with pregnancy leaves, where men
were not offered disability leaves? This question was raised in California
Federal Savings and Loan Corp. v. Guerra,2 8 (hereinafter Cal. Fed.)
which held that the PDA did not prohibit states from mandating pregnancy leaves.29
Cal. Fed., however, did not resolve the fundamental issue: what does
discrimination against women mean? Does it mean that women must be
afforded benefits to ease the burdens imposed by pregnancy, or that they
must be treated similarly to men? And how can women be treated similarly to men, who cannot become pregnant? Does it mean, as Geduldig
implied, that there is no such thing as discrimination on the basis of pregnancy? Or do we need to reconsider our views about the meaning of dis24. Id. at 496, n.20.
25. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). On the other hand, in Nashville Gas v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), the
Court found that a policy which stripped workers of their seniority when they took disability leaves
on account of pregnancy violated Title VII. The major distinction noted by the Court was that the
employer in Nashville placed a burden on pregnant employees, while the employer in Gilbert merely
failed to provide a benefit. Id. at 142. This distinction is disingenuous at best, and demonstrates the
poverty of the analysis begun in Geduldig.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(k) (1982).
27. Id. For a discussion of the legislative history of the PDA, see Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
28. 479 U.S. 272 (1987); see Miller-Wohl Co. v. Comm'r of Labor and Industry of Mont., 692
P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984), vacated and remanded, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987).
29. For a detailed discussion of Cal.Fed., see infra text accompanying notes 175-81.
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crimination and equality? And what about the many other ways in which
men and women are dissimilarly situated for reasons other than biology,
such as childrearing? Is a recognition of such differences a return to
Bradwell, or is there more to equality than the eradication of outdated
stereotypes?
B.

The Feminist Debate

These issues have become the focus of a heated debate among feminist scholars. A brief review of that debate is critical to understanding the
problems that issues of sex discrimination present to equality theory.
On one side of that debate are the advocates of the "similar treatment" approach.30 These scholars argue that the best or even the only
way to end discrimination against women is to require similar treatment
to that afforded men. They believe that pregnancy should be treated as a
disability-no more, no less.3 1 Any special recognition of the uniqueness
of pregnancy, or of any other distinction between the sexes, will raise the
specter of protective legislation and result in a perpetuation of stereotypes and second class status for women.
Professor Williams has written the most comprehensive exposition
of this approach. 32 According to Williams, the approach is preferable
partially for strategic reasons. Given the law's traditional assumption
that equality means the equal treatment of those similarly situated, 33 any
approach that recognizes the differences between the sexes, or advocates
any non-gender neutral approach, is susceptible to the charge that women are seeking "special" treatment, and is doomed to judicial
dismissal.34
Although Williams accepts that discrimination doctrine has a limited vision of equality,35 she argues that her approach can have a significant impact for two reasons. First, she believes that many of the needs of
30. See Taub, From ParentingLeaves to NurturingLeaves, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
381 (1984-85); Taub & Williams, Will Equality Require More Than Assimilation,Accommodation or
Separationfrom the Existing Social Structure?, 37 RUTGERs L. RiEv. 37 RuTGERs L. Rv./Clv.
RTS. DEVS. 825 (1985); Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism and PreferentialTreatment: An Approach to
the Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581 (1977); Williams, supra note 2.
31. See, eg., Williams, supra note 2, at 327.
32. See id. at 325-80.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 112-14.
34. Williams, supra note 2, at 346.
35. While other theorists have presented a more critical vision of equality (see infra text accompanying notes 39-49), few can deny Williams' analysis of how the Court tends to see the issues. Even
the recent Cal.Fed. decision does not change the basic soundness of this observation. See infra text

accompanying notes 175-85.
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Second, in a

somewhat contradictory fashion, she claims that disparate impact theory

can be used "to squeeze the male tilt out of purportedly neutral legal
structure...

."7

What she fails to see is that disparate impact theory is

just as limited as the underlying equality doctrine which compels her to
use gender neutrality in the first place.3
More importantly, the requirement that the sexes be treated similarly, or in gender neutral terms, begs the question: "similar to whom?"
What is the model against which similar treatment shall be measured? To

critics of the similar treatment approach, that model is a male model,
based on the conditions and norms typically found among middle class,
white men. 39 Being judged against that model, women inevitably come
up short.
Building on that observation, one group of scholars believes that
where men and women are biologically different, they should be treated
differently by the law.' Because reproduction is one area where there are
clear biological differences, they believe that pregnancy and childbirth
should be carved out from the general rule of similar treatment. According to Professor Law:
[P]regnancy, abortion, reproduction and creation of another human being
are special-very special. Women have these experiences. Men do not. An
equality doctrine that ignores the unique quality of these experiences implicitly says that women can claim equality only insofar as they are like
men. Such a doctrine demands that women deny an important aspect of
who they are.4 1
36. Williams, supra note 2, at 374-75.
37. Id. at 331. This is contradictory because if disparate impact theory was as powerful as Williams believes, it could pierce through gender neutral statutes, such as parenting leaves, that tend to
benefit women more than men. See infra text accompanying notes 167-73.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 150-66.
39. See Finley, supra note 2; Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court,
92 YALE L.J. 913 (1983); Krieger & Cooney, supranote 2; Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directionsof Sex DiscriminationLaw, 1979 Wis. L. REv.55. Professor Taub's similar treatment
approach is especially susceptible to this criticism. Concerned about the impact of stereotypical assumptions, she believes that women should prevail on discrimination claims where they can show
that "the adverse employment decision was based on an expectation that women should conform to
a certain pattern of behavior." Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping PerSe as a Form
of Employment Discrimination,21 B.C.L. REV. 345, 418 (1980). However, Taub's definition of discrimination entitles women to no "special treatment" when women actually do conform to stereotypical behavior, for example, when performing childrearing functions. See id. at 390-96.
40. See Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences into Account, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
699, 762 (1986); Kay, Models of Equality, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 39, 47; Law, supra note 2, passim;
Scales, supra note 2, at 431.
41. Law, supra note 2, at 1007 (emphasis in the original).
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The biological differences approach has much to recommend it. It
recognizes that the problem with Geduldig was the Court's inability to

understand that reproduction is sex-linked. Moreover, tying pregnancy
leaves to disability policies means that they will only be offered when
they fit into timetables set to accommodate illnesses, and only in cases
where women are entitled to disability benefits. 2 Since women are often
in low paying, non-unionized jobs, they are likely to receive little help

from such a policy.43 Further, the approach recognizes that as long as
reproductive policies are tied to experiences which men face, such poli-

cies cannot adequately resolve the pressing issues confronting women.
The central lesson of the biological differences approach is that for-

mal equality cannot assure true equality when individuals are not, in fact,
similarly situated. This insight, however, suggests a broader attack on the
similar treatment position.

Reproduction is not the only area in which women and men are
biologically different. On average, men and women differ in such matters

as height, weight, and life span. Law states that such differences should
not justify differential treatment because they are only average differ-

ences" -- - but so, too, are reproductive differences. For example, not all
women can bear children. Thus, biology, alone, offers no clear guide to
determining what differences should be taken into account. More funda-

mentally, men and women are differently situated with respect to numerous economic, political, and social circumstances. If women cannot

achieve equality when they are not similarly situated to men with respect
to biology, how can they achieve equality in any of these other areas?"
42. This approach distinguishes pregnancy leaves, which are limited to the time necessary for
recovering from childbirth, from childbearing leaves, which are not biologically linked, and therefore, according to biological differences scholars, should be subject to a gender neutral approach. See
Dowd, supra note 40, at 720.
43. Finley, supra note 2, at 1125-26; COMM. ON WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT AND RELATED SOCIAL ISSUES, COMM'N. ON BEHAVIORAL AND Soc. ScI. AND EDUC., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB, 13-15 (B. Reskin & H. Hartman

ed. 1986) [hereinafter WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK]
44. Law, supra note 2, at 1004.
45. Proponents of the biological differences approach argue against a broader attack on the
similar treatment doctrine because they are afraid that to do so would perpetuate sexual stereotyping. See Law, supra note 2, at 1008; Scales, supra note 2, at 433; Krieger & Cooney, supra note 2, at
567. What they fail to see is that biology cannot provide a clear, apolitical vehicle for determining
which differences should count. For example, the very need for pregnancy leave arises not only
because pregnancy is biologically linked, but because of the social configuration of the workplace,
and social conditions which lead women to need or choose to work there. Social factors intermix
with a variety of biologically linked factors to determine differences in the experiences and needs of
men and women. Biology alone cannot tell us how to value those experiences.
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Such observations have led many feminist legal scholars to advocate
a far fuller recognition of the differences between the sexes, and an ex-

pansive vision of equality that can accomodate those differences.46
Although these scholars vary in their approach, they share a common
belief that the similar treatment paradigm, as reflected in cases from
Frontieroto Geduldig, has been of limited benefit to most women.4 7 The
cases grant women equality only when their experiences parallel those of

men, which often does not occur. Moreover, the goal of assimilation,
which underlies the similar treatment approach, is problematical because

we cannot assume that the differences between the sexes are trivial, or
that women should or could strive to act as men.

Underlying this critique is an assessment that not all of the differences between the sexes are bad stereotypes; indeed, many have positive

social value. Influenced by the work of Professor Gilligan,48 some scholars believe that women tend to have different values and moral perspectives than do most men.49 To these authors, women are more likely to

hold values of interdependence, nurturance and altruism, in contrast to
competitive and individualistic values."

The positive values associated

with women would be lost by adoption of the similar treatment
approach.
We share the criticisms of the similar treatment approach raised by
46. Such scholars include E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1980); Finley, supra note 2; Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working
Mothers, 59 B.U.L. REv. 55 (1979); Littleton, supra note 2, passim; Minow, "Forming Underneath
Everything that Grows" Toward A History ofFamily Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819 (1985); Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983);
Note, Toward a Redefinition ofSexual Equality, 95 HARv. L. REV. 487 (1981).
47. Professor Finley contends that she is not an advocate of the difference approach, but her
definition of that approach is far narrower than our .own. She sees the difference approach as one
which stresses how women are different from men, forcing the comparison between the sexes. Instead, she strives to transcend the debate and stress how recognition of the needs of childbearing and
childrearing affect both sexes. We classify her as a difference scholar because of her recognition of
the positive ways in which women differ from men, and her criticism of the ways in which courts
assume that male life experiences are the only life experiences.
48. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
49. None of these observations applies to all women, or all men. The claim is rather that women
as a class tend to differ from men in these respects. See The 1984 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 46-47
(1985) [hereinafter Feminist Discourse] (Gilligan speaking). In her book, Gilligan is also careful to
note that such differences need not be due to biology, but to social and cultural factors. Gilligan,
supra note 48, at 2, 16-23.
50. GILLIGAN, supra note 48, at 16-23; Gould, Private Rights and Public Virtues: Women, the
Family, and Democracy, in BEYOND DOMINATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 17 (C. Gould ed. 1984); Finley, supra note 2, at 1119; Olsen, supra note 46, at 1499-1501.
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the difference scholars.5 1 We also share their belief that many of the differences between men and women are valuable to society as a whole, and
cannot and should not be obliterated or ignored in the name of "equal
treatment." Indeed, we begin with their premises. However, we beleive

that the goals they seek are incompatible with existing constitutional
analysis.5 2 Feminist legal scholars have provided an expanded vision of

equality, and have shown how equality doctrine, as now formulated, relies on norms which disadvantage women. 3 The purpose of this Article
is to build upon this scholarship by exploring how the concepts of dis-

crimination, legal rights, and legal reasoning themselves operate to
thwart the achievement of feminist goals.

4

Both discrimination law and

the traditional constitutional discourse operate in a similar fashion to
limit the law's ability to respond to the claims of women.
II.

THE SUBORDINATION OF WOMEN

In order to understand why existing legal doctrines cannot achieve
feminist goals, it is necessary to see what meaningful equality for women
involves. 5 Although legal theorists disagree over what equality does and
51.

MacKinnon criticizes both the equal treatment and difference approaches. C.

MACKINNON,

FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-40 (1987). She suggests a "dominance" approach to change gender

"from a distinction that is presumptively valid to a detriment that is presumptively suspect." Id. at
44. She argues that viewing sex equality as a question of "reasonable or unreasonable classification is
part of the way male dominance is expressed in law." Id. at 44. To MacKinnon, sex inequalities are
matters of "naked power." Id. at 43.
52. Some difference scholars assume that the law can easily accommodate different values. Professor Wolgast, for example, relies heavily on the case of the handicapped to assert that the law
recognizes "special rights" in some instances, and should therefore recognize those rights with respect to women. WOLGAST, supra note 46, at 47-49. The problem with her analysis is that it does not
address how very limited those special rights are, even in the case of the handicapped. Bowen v.
American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986); Minow, .When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes
for the Mentally Retarded,EqualProtection andLegal Treatment ofDifference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 111 (1987); Parmet, AIDS and the Limits of DiscriminationLaw, 15 LAW, MED. AND
HEALTH CARE 61 (1987). More importantly, it does not consider that the statutory rights afforded
the handicapped are of a very different character than the constitutional rights to equality which
women seek. See infra text accompanying notes 325-51.
53. Finley recognizes the powerful force of the underlying male model, Finley, supra note 2, at
1118-21, but she is unable to explain how those values interact with equality theory or the notion of
legal rights. Moreover, her presumption that true equality will emerge when the underlying value
system changes, id. at 1167-68, lacks a full assessment ofjust how difficult it would be to realize such
a change, given the nature of legal rights.
54. Professor Scales has similarly argued that the process of legal reasoning must be changed to
provide equal rights for women. See Scales, The Emergence of FeministJurisprudence:An Essay, 95
YALE L.J. 1373, 1386-88, 1399-1403 (1986). Her approach to the issue, however, is far different from
our own.
55. We do not attempt to respond to all critics of the feminist view of equality. Nor, for that
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should mean, 56 to feminists, gender equality has a very concrete meaning:5 7 It is the eradication of the subordination women experience.5 8 As
we discuss below, any theory of equality that is not grounded in the real
world experiences of women is not responsive to their needs, and is thus
not a meaningful view of equality.
An important characteristic of women's subordination is the economic insecurity of most women. 9 Under the present legal regime, there
are three sources of financial support for women: paid labor; the wages
and job benefits of other family members; and governmental benefits programs. Despite statutes purportedly guaranteeing women's equal participation in the labor market,6" women remain in an economically tenuous
position. The median earnings for women working full time are 69 permatter, do we engage in the debate over the proper reading of the equal protection clause. We merely
describe the feminist view and briefly demonstrate why it is critical to women and society as a
predicate for our discussion of the law's limitations.
56. For example, some see equality as involving equal access to the political process. See J.Ely,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 74 (1980). Others see it as having specific substantive goals. See, e.g.,
L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 10-20 (1985). Some, such as Professor Westen believe it has
no meaning whatsoever. Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. "REV. 537 (1982).
57. Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice (Book Review),
96 YALE L.J. 914 (1987); Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics:Perspectivesfrom the Wo.
men's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 601-04 (1986). Of course, not everyone writing about
gender issues agrees. For example, D. KIRP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS, GENDER JUSTICE 87
(1986)[hereinafter GENDER JUSTICE], argue that gender equality means an abstract right to autonomy and choice.
58. This is not to say that improving the lives of women is or should be a legal rule. We are only
saying that the eradication of the subordination of women is an underlying moral and normative
principle, tied to both the generally accredited interpretation of the fourteenth amendment and our
nation's ideology. Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5 (1976). Translating these often obtuse principles and

norms into workable legal doctrines is quite another matter; the difficulties associated with that task
form the heart of this Article. Kirp, Yudof, and Franks disagree with our view of equality. To them,
historically women have received better treatment than men. See GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 57, at
87. Although it seems clear that the law's recognition of sex-role differences did disadvantage men in
a few ways (i.e., minimum hours laws could not be applied to men), this analysis is unconvincing.
Historical evidence about the relative conditions of men and women gives little reason to believe that
women were advantaged by the law's treatment of them. J.BAER, supra note 10, at 19-23; B WERTHEIMER, WE WERE THERE: THE STORY OF WORKING WOMEN IN AMERICA, passim (1977); Minow, supra note 46, at 827-36. Moreover, the fact that some men either believed or merely stated
that women's legal disabilities were "for their own good" appears in retrospect to be ultimately
irrelevant. Slaveowners also proclaimed that the legal regime of slavery benefitted the slaves. See,
e.g., A Southern Clergyman, "A Defense of Southern Slavery Against The Attacks of Henry Clay
and Alex'r Campbell" in A Defense of Southern Slavery and Other Pamphlets 24 (Negro Universities ed. 1969). The justifications given for legal disabilities are often self-serving and ultimately specious, whether or not they are made in good faith.
59. This is not to deny that many men are also economically insecure.
60. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982), and
the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
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cent of what men earn.61 Women remain segregated in low paying jobs.62
Fewer women work in jobs with pension and retirement benefits.6 3

Historically this inferior position in the labor market was legitimated by the assumption that a woman would be economically supported by her family. 64 Such economic dependency on men has often left
women vulnerable to violence and abuse.65 Moreover, more and more
families find that two incomes are necessary to sustain what the Bureau

of Labor Statistics calls "a modest but adequate" life style.6 6 Compounding this harsh economic reality is the fact that fewer women can
rely on being part of a two-income family. 67 The dramatic increase in

divorce has been accompanied by a substantial decline in the number of
women who receive alimony.68 Professor Lenore Weitzman has found

that in the first year after divorce, women in California experience a 73
percent decline in their living standards. 69 In addition, there is an in-

crease in the number of women who have never been married who are
raising children. 70 Forty-eight percent of poor families are headed by wo61. United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Weekly Earnings of Wage
and Salary Workers: First Quarter1987, April 28, 1987.
62. WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK, supra note 43, at 5-13. In 1985, women comprised 54.5
percent of the work force. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1987, 376 (107th ed. 1986) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1987]. They were overwhelmingly employed in the clerical (29 percent of all women workers) and service (18.5 percent of all women workers) areas. Id. at 385-86. Yet women constituted less
than 7 percent of engineers, 7 percent of dentists, 18 percent of physicians, 19 percent of attorneys,
and 36 percent of all executives, administrators, and managers. Id. at 385.
63. L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 114 (1985) (discusses pensions as potentially the most valuable asset in marriages).
64. A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 6, at 300-10.
65. S. SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE
BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 224-26 (1982); MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and
the State: Toward a FeministJurisprudence,8 SIGNS 635, 657 (1983). From 1981 to 1985, an average
of 82,300 rapes were reported each year. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1987, supra note 62, at 155. A
recent national survey of college-age women found that 27.5 percent reported having been raped at
some point since age 14. N.Y. Times, April 21, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
66. A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 6, at 302; M. GLENDON, THE NEw FAMILY AND THE
NEW PROPERTY 89-91 (1981).
67. D. MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NATION 147 (1986); R. SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN
LAST: THE PLIGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AFFLUENT AMERICA 15-18 (1986); L. WEITZMAN, supra
note 63, at xvii.

68. L. Weitzman, supra note 63, at 32. As of 1978, only one-sixth of divorced women received
alimony. Id. at 33.
69. Id. at 36. In contrast, former husbands experience a 42 percent increase in their standard of
living. Id. at xii. See also Bowen v. Gillard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (divorce
causes decline in women's income).
70. D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 146-47.
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men.7 1 Today we witness the "feminization of poverty." 72
For poor women, governmental assistance programs are often the

only means of support. Women with children often find themselves eligible only for Aid for Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), 73 in

which benefits are not tied to the cost of living. 74 In 1984 AFDC provided, on the average, $325 per month per family, an amount which varied widely by state.7 5 The price for these meager benefits is often
stigmatization, dependency and powerlessness. 76

The consequences of women's economic plight include not only material deprivation but also second-class citizenship.7 7 Political theorists
have long recognized that a certain level of financial independence is crit-

ical to being a full participant in a republic. 78 Without economic security,
individuals are both marginalized by the social structure and dependent
on the politically powerful. 79 Further, in very practical terms, the poor

simply lack the resources necessary for political participation.

0

Thus

there is an unavoidable correlation between economic status and political
71. R. SIDEL, supra note 67, at xvi.
72. Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare, URa. & SOC. CHANGE
REV. (Nos. I & 2 1978).
73. Older women may be eligible for social security benefits, the payments of which are higher

than the subsistence levels of AFDC. Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patri.
archy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1325-36 (1983).
74. D. MOYNIHAN, supranote 67, at 15; R. SIDEL, supra note 67, at 84-88. Law, supra note 73,
at 1326-28.
75.

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT: 1987, supra note 62, at 365, chart no. 622. Mississippi has the

lowest amount, $91 per month per family; Alaska has the highest at $501 per month per family. Id.
See R. SIDEL, supra note 67, at 8489.
76. F. Fox PIVEN and R. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC
WELFARE 166-74 (1971); Law, supra note 73, at 1281-82.

77. In 1984, women comprised 52.7% of the voting age population. Statistical Abstract: 1987,
supra note 62, at 244. However, that year, only twenty-two women were elected to the House of
Representatives (or 4.1 percent), and only two women were elected to the Senate (2 percent). Id. at
237. Further, in 1986 no women held statewide elective office in twenty-one states, and women

comprised only 14.8 percent of state legislators. Id. at 241.
78. J.LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT: A CRITICAL EDITION

WITH AN INTRODUC-

TION AND AN APPARATUS CRITICUS 116-17, 366, 428, 441-42 (Laslett ed. 1960); J.S.MILL, THREE
ESSAYS: ON LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, AND THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 280-81

(1975 ed.); MONTEsQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 96 (T.Nugent trans. 1949); see also C.
WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 248 (1956) (Congressmen are those who have been "successful

in entrepreneurial and professional endeavors... are at least solid, upper-middle class in income and
status.").
79.

Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 785-86 (1964).

80. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966), discussed infra in
text accompanying notes 291-97; First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
(ability to spend money on referendum questions as political freedom).
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influence. 8' The continued subordination of women into an economic underclass inevitably disables women from full and meaningful citizenship.
Moreover, the feminization of poverty does not affect women alone.
Nearly one-fourth of all children today are being raised in poverty.8" The
consequences for these children, and for the society they will inherit, will
be severe. A society stratified by a rigid and deep class structure, with a
poor and unskilled underclass, is83in jeopardy for both its political stability and its economic prosperity.
In the past, many of the issues confronting women, such as childrearing, sexual harassment, spousal abuse and child support have been
dismissed as issues of personal choice and purely private concern. 4 This
dismissal has been legitimated by the ideology of separate spheres.85 That
ideology is a powerful and pervasive belief system which sees social life as
divided between two spheres, one public and male, the other private and
female. According to this ideology, the private sphere is the locus of the
home, the family, and care-giving. The values and norms associated with
it are relational, non-hierarchical, and altruistic.86 With the rise of industrialization and urbanization these functions became segregated from the
"public" world of commerce, the market and politics. While women
were expected to fulfill familial functions in the private sphere, men were
expected to operate primarily in public life.87
This ideological construct sees the public sphere as embodying the
values of competition, individualism, economic rationalism, and hierarchy.8 8 Given the dominance of the public sphere, it is not surprising that
the attributes associated with it became and remain the predominant
81.

V.0. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy 196 (1961); P. KLEPPNER, WHO

VOTED? THE DYNAMICS OF ELECTORAL TURNOUT, 1870-1980 at 154 (1982).

82. D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 51; R. SIDEL, supra note 67, at 3.
83. J. LOCKE, supra note 78, at 441-42; K. Marx, The Coming Upheaval, in the MARX-ENGELS
READER 218-19 (R. Tucker ed. 1978); D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 23-29; R. SIDEL, supra note
67, at 189-93; REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS 203-206

(1968).
84. Olsen, supra note 46, at 1505-09 (collecting cases).
85. Finley, supra note 2, at 1118-19; MacKinnon, supra note 65, at 644, 657-58; Minow, supra
note 46, at 832; Olsen, supra note 46, at 1498; cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
86. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 48, at 16-17; Gould, supra note 50, at 7. Of course, this is an
association, not an identity.
87. S. FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX 25-31 (1970);

J.

MITCHELL, WOMAN'S ESTATE

passim (1973 ed.); Minow, supra note 46, at 835; Olsen, supra note 46, at 1500. For a lengthy analysis of the historical evolution of this development see L. STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE
IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, passim (1977).
88. Finley, supra note 2, at 1118; Olsen, supra note 46, at 1500.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

value structure.8 9 Women, often denied access to that sphere, find their
subordination legitimated by their inability to "compete" and to embrace

the norms of the public sphere.
The ideology of the separate spheres is a social construct; there are

no natural fixed spheres. Nevertheless, ideology can both reflect and influence reality. Thus, despite some changes in recent years, women to a
large degree live lives that are more touched by the attributes the ideol-

ogy consigns to the private sphere. Women are primarily responsible for

childrearing, 90 for care of the sick, elderly, and disabled, 91 and for main-

taining a functioning household.92 In addition, women have been respon-

sible for maintaining the home as a refuge from the alienation and stress
93
of the workplace.
Despite the increased participation of women in the labor market,
the demands that the private sphere imposes on their lives have not di-

minished.94 Moreover, it is not surprising that women, having been
raised and acculturated to perform these familial roles, have developed

values and perspectives the ideology associates with the private sphere. 95
According to Professor Minow, women have developed an "ethos of
care" 96 in contrast to the ethos of rights characterizing the male dominated public sphere.9 7
The functions and norms associated with the private sphere have

been undervalued. Despite the national rhetoric lauding motherhood and
family, the reality of women's experience makes the denigration of wo-

men's experience readily apparent. For example, most women receive no
89. Finley, supra note 2, at 1120; MacKinnon, supra note 65, at 644, 657-58; Minow, supra note
46, at 835; Olsen, supra note 46, at 1500.
90. Dowd, supra note 40, at 699; Note, Title IX, DisparateImpact and Child Care: Can a Refusal to Cooperate in the Provisionof Child CareConstitute Sex Discrimination Under Title IX?, 52 U.
COLO. L. REV. 271, 273 (1981).
91. Taub, supra note 30, at 385-90.

92.

L.

POGREBIN, FAMILY POLITICS LOVE AND POWER ON AN INTIMATE FRONTIER

145

(1983); Rowe, Childcarefor the 1980s: TraditionalSex Roles or Androgyny? in WOMEN INTO WIVES
169-71 (1977).
93. S. ROWBOTHAM, WOMAN'S CONSCIOUSNESS, MAN'S WORLD 49-50 (1973); Olsen, supra
note 46, at 1524.
94. S.KAMMERMAN, A. KAHN, P. KINGSTON, MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING WOMEN
5 (1983) (85% of working women are likely to become pregnant during their working lives, and
many of these women will continue to work after giving birth) [hereinafter MATERNITY POLICIES];
L. POGREBIN, supra note 92, at 145 (working women spend just under five hours per day on house
and family work).
95. Minow, supra note 46, at 838; FeministDiscourse,supra note 49, at 44 (Gilligan speaking);
id,at 19 (Dunlap speaking).
96. Minow, supra note 46, at 884.
97. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 48, at 164.
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income for childrearing or housework. Upon divorce or separation wo-

men who have not been part of the paid labor force find themselves in
severe financial distress.9" Lacking "marketable" skills, accrued seniority, and all of the benefits attached to paid labor,9 9 these women find
themselves "displaced homemakers" without any economic security or
recognition for the work they have performed. The abolition of alimony,
the inadequacy of equitable distribution, and the infrequency and unenforceability of child support orders both exacerbate this problem and

demonstrate the devaluation of women by the legal regime."° And those
women who work outside the home find the workplace inhospitable to

familial responsibilities which "working women" nevertheless continue
to fulfill.10 1 Given the burdens placed upon them, women often are un-

able to achieve the economic rewards available to men.
In addition, women who work outside of the home are often relegated by a sex segregated workplace to lower paying "women's work."1 "2

Many of these jobs (such as nursing and teaching) require women to perform functions similar to those they perform at home. The low wages

paid for these jobs further evidence the lack of worth assigned to such
functions and the values associated with them.
The undeniable importance of both nursing care and education sug98. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 63, at 344.
99. Professor Glendon has demonstrated that benefits attaching to paid labor have taken the
place of familial property and assets in modem industrial societies. M. GLENDON, THE NEw FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY

45-46, 91 (1981).

100. Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy: The Systematic Imposition of Costs on Women, 6
HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 1, 13-14 (1983).
101. Finley, supra note 2, at 1120; Dowd, supra note 40, at 715. This inhospitability is multifaceted. Married women or women with young children have always had greater difficulty in finding work outside the home. See authorities collected in Finley, supranote 2, at 1123 n.17. The notion
that married women and women with children work less intensely because of their family responsibilities is often used to justify paying them lower wages. Osterman, Sex Discriminationin Professorial
Employment: A Case Study, 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 451, 457-61 (1978). For a criticism of the
human capital theorists who accept this justification see Brown, Baumann & Melnick, Equal Payfor
Jobs of Comparable Worth: An Analysis of the Rhetoric, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 127, 135-37
(1986) [hereinafter Equal Pay]. Most employers do not provide anywhere near adequate maternity or
childbearing leaves. In addition, the lack of "desirable" part-time work, Chamallas, Women And
Part-Time Work- The Casefor Pay Equity and Equal Access, 64 N.C.L. REV. 709 (1986), combined
with the lack of adequate day care severely impede women's ability to participate in the labor market. Note, supra note 90, at 273-74. Moreover, the prevalence of both sexual harassment (see C.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, 51 (1979); Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)) and pay inequity (see WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK, supranote 43, at
10-13) further constrain women's advancement in the workforce. These factors as well as the unavailability of day care also restrict participation in the labor market. R. SIDEL, supra note 67, at
120-32.
102. WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK, supra note 43, at 120-31.

590

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

gests, however, society's critical need for these activities."' 3 Equally important are childrearing, caring for the elderly or infirm, and maintaining
a home."° The fact that such work is vital to society as a whole is often
overlooked. Yet, a world that ignores the work and values associated
with the private sphere would be both unpleasant and less productive.
And, indeed, much of the criticism of contemporary American society
stresses the lack of altruism, compassion, and a communal perspective. 105
06
Further, a view of equality that devalues women's experiences
and fails to assign importance to the norms associated with the private
sphere subordinates women, and prevents them from leading lives of full
dignity and political power-in other words, from being full citizens.' 0 7
To redress this failing and ensure women true citizenship, equality must
recognize the values and realities of women's lives. Unfortunately, current discrimination law is incapable of achieving this.

III.

THE LIMITATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW

Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education,0 8 some courts became
sensitive to social and racial inequalities. 0 9 In Frontierov. Richardson 110
103. The current shortage of nurses illustrates this point. Ninety-seven percent of nurses are
women. Student enrollments in nursing school have dropped from 233,511 in 1974 to 175,043 in
1985. Between 1985 and 1986, the vacancy rate for registered nurses in hospitals increased from 6.3
percent to 13.6 percent. Sege,Medicine Overtakes Nursingas a CareerLure to Women, Boston Globe,
June 1, 1987 at 41-42. This decrease in the number of nurses has occurred despite the potential
increase in demand for nursing support services for home care and care of the elderly. Id. at 41-42.
104. If women were to behave rationally in the economic sense, they would neither marry nor
have children.
105. R. BELLAH, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER, S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART VII-VIII, 17779 (1986) [hereinafter HABITS OF THE HEART]; C. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSIsM 25-27
(1979); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 670-73 (1983). The
recent Securities and Exchange Commission investigations into insider trading on Wall Street illustrate the potential results from untempered competition. See Big Trader to Pay US. $100 Millionfor
InsiderAbuses, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1986, at 1, col. 6; Insider Pleads Guilty in $12.6 Million Stock
Case, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
106. Nothing we say is intended to or would limit the freedom of men to assume such traditionally female functions as child care. But the fact remains that few men have actually done this, and
Taub points out that men are not likely to do so as long as child care "is neither paid nor easily
coordinated with paid work in the market." Taub, supra note 30, at 383; see also Williams, supra
note 2, at 378 n.213 (even where parenting leave is available on a gender neutral basis, women "still
use leaves more often and for longer periods than do men.").
107. For this reason, abstracted rights of access are of little help to most women. See infra text
accompanying notes 416-22.
108. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109. See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir.
1970); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291, 295-96 (9th
Cir. 1970); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 926-32 (2d Cir.
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such sensitivity seemed to include women."' 1 That understanding of inequality was inevitably hampered by the underlying ideology of the legal
regime. Formed by that ideology, discrimination law is inherently

limited.
In order to analyze the limitations in discrimination law, in this section we discuss its methodology and fundamental structure. We do so by

examining major Supreme Court cases affecting women, not to demonstrate that they were wrongly decided, but rather as examples of the

deep-rooted limitations thwarting the achievement of equality.
.A.

Substituting Culpabilityfor Equality

The most basic tenet of discrimination law is that similarly situated
people be treated similarly.I 12 This seemingly straightforward formalistic
approach is in reality impossible to apply. No two individuals are ever
identically situated. The important inquiries, then, are who is similar to
1968). These cases were overruled in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), "to the extent that
those cases rested on or expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary
in making out an equal protection violation." Id., at 245. See Fiss, The Fate of an Idea Whose Time
Has Come: AntidiscriminationLaw in the Second Decade after Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U.
CHi. L. REv. 742, 748-56, 768-69 (1974).
110. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
111. It is not our purpose to compare sex discrimination cases and race discrimination cases or
to address whether race and sex should be treated identically by the courts. See, Kay, supra note 40,
passim; Wasserstrom, supra note 30, 584-85. The courts sometimes view race and sex discrimination
as comparable. "[T]hroughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in
many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes." Frontierov. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 685. Yet every court which has considered the matter has refused to find that sex
discrimination claims are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the statute passed primarily to confer
citizenship rights on the newly freed slaves. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976);
Bobo v. ITT, Continental Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 342-43 (5th Cir. 1981); Raether v. Phillips, 401
F. Supp. 1393,1396 (W.D. Va. 1975); cf St. Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987)
(delineating coverage of § 1981) and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (coverage of § 1982 is the same as § 1981). A particularly disingenuous statement on the relationship
between race and sex discrimination appears in Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 266, 303 (1978). Powell concludes that gender classifications are
more "manageable" and present simpler problems than race classifications because while there are
many different minority groups, there are only two sexes.
112. Tussman and tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344
(1949). According to Aristotle, this principle is the foundation of distributive justice. NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS, BOOK V at 113 la (W.D. Ross trans. 1925). The principle is applicable whether the source of
the equality mandate is constitutional or statutory. Feminists have correctly observed that the Tussman and tenBroek approach follows the methodology of the male model. See, e.g., Wildman, The
Legitimation of Sex Discrimination:A CriticalResponse to Supreme CourtJurisprudence,63 OR. L.
REV. 265, 267, 270-72 (1984).
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whom and in what ways; in other words, what differences count?1 13
The resolution of these questions is necessarily value laden. Discrimination law incorporates values rooted in a society where men are breadwinners and women are at home raising children and managing the
household.
The inadequacy of the premise that similarly situated people deserve
similar treatment is exposed when women are unable or unwilling to situate themselves similarly to men.' 4 Current discrimination doctrine requires women either to accept subordination and dependency or assume
the male role in its entirety, thus abandoning the functions and values
which are central to most women's lives.
For example, in Geduldig, the Court allowed the defendant to ignore
the biological reality of the relationship between pregnancy and gender
because the defendant did not "cause" the injury to the plaintiff. Implicit
in the Court's decision is the assumption that the plaintiff's "voluntary"
pregnancy was the underlying cause of her inequality. The necessity of
pregnancy for the continuation of human existence, a fact that earlier
jurists understood all too well,'1 was ignored. A woman could avoid any
inequity simply by not bearing children.I 6 In other words, in the absence
of a malevolently motivated defendant legally responsible for the pregnancy, sex discrimination, as defined by the Geduldig Court, has not
occurred."17
Certainly, where the Court faced overt gender classifications, it frequently struck them down, often acknowledging the error of historical
stereotypes.'1 8 But when confronted with pregnancy, which the Court
113. Brest, supra note 58, at 6-8; Finley, supra note 2, at 1139-42, 1149-50, 1167-70; Westen, supra
note 56, at 539-48.
114. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1977) (employee's "very womanhood" would

"undermine her capacity" to perform job as correctional counsellor); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. at 136, 138-40; Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 500-01 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In

early cases where women merely sought privileges which men enjoyed, this caused a lesser problem.
See, eg., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-16, (1975) (invalidating state law limiting child support

obligation for female children); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971) (invalidating statute which
codified a preference for men as administrators of estates); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444

F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (state law limitations on number of hours women may work are contrary to
Title VII).
115. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. at 421-23; Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141-42
(Bradley, J., concurring).
116. The significant difference between pregnancy and diseases or disabilities affecting only men
is that pregnancy is "voluntary". Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136, 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 136; Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 140-42 (1977).
118. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (gender classifications "carry the inherent
risk of reinforcing stereotypes"); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975) (condemning the "role-
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presumed was a voluntary condition, the Court shifted its attention from
sex stereotyping to the defendant's culpability. The focus was on what
the defendant did and not on the implications of pregnancy either for
women or for society. Individual women could avoid any adverse impact
by simply acting as men and refraining from pregnancy.
In Washington v. Davis," 9 the Court institutionalized the anti-equality philosophy of Geduldig. Washington v. Davis, while affirming the use
of a facially neutral employment examination, held that proof of disproportionate impact was insufficient and that plaintiffs -must prove defendant's racially discriminatory motivation to establish an equal protection
violation.' 2 0 Requiring proof of intent shifts the focus from inequality of
result and the ability of the defendant to rectify that inequality to the
nature of defendant's activities and the defendant's subjective state of
mind. This approach separates results from motive. But as Justice Stevens recognized in his concurring opinion, this division is neither easily
accomplished nor readily apparent:
It is unrealistic, on the one hand, to require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the actual subjective intent of the decisionmaker, or
conversely, to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in the decisional
process.. .My point in making this observation is to suggest that the line
between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as
bright, and perhaps
not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion
21
might assume.1

Washington v. Davis assumes the existence of a nondiscriminatory
society. In that world, most defendants act in rational and nondiscriminatory ways and the burden of proving otherwise is justifiably on the
plaintiff.' 22 The only ways that plaintiff can meet this burden is by showing invidious intent. Thus a "neutral" reason for a government policy,
typing society has long imposed" on women); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975)

(notion that men are more likely than women to be breadwinners cannot justify the "denigration" of
working women).
119. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
120. Id. at 239. The Court declined to follow the rule of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431-32 (1971), which had permitted disparate impact claims under Title VII. 426 U.S. at 238-39.
121. 426 U.S. at 253-54.
122. For arguments supporting reference to motivation as central to equal protection and fundamental rights analysis, see Clark, Legislative Motivation and FundamentalRights in Constitutional
Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953 (1978) and Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A
Motivation Theory of the ConstitutionalBan Against Racial Discrimination,15 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1041 (1978); cf.Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J.
1205 (1970) (proof of discriminatory intent is not applicable to entire spectrum of equal protection
analysis); Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and IllicitMotive: Theories of ConstitutionalAdjudica-
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notwithstanding its disproportionate racial impact, is sufficient to protect
12 3
that policy from challenge.
Looked at solely in terms of a litigation model, Washington v. Davis
simply added an element to plaintiff's prima facie case: a showing of
defendant's subjective intent to discriminate.' 24 After Washington v. Davis and its progeny,' 25 a plaintiff cannot survive a motion for a directed
verdict without this proof. But even when viewed only in a technical or
evidentiary sense, this requirement is critical. It makes it very difficult for
plaintiffs to prevail; 2 6 proof of defendant's state of mind is an enormously heavy, indeed often insurmountable burden for plaintiffs.' 27
The effect on women has been harsh since the inequities that women
confront now are most often embodied in facially gender neutral practices. Feminist scholars have taught that most ostensibly gender neutral
rules incorporate the experiences of white, middle-class men and are thus
not neutral at all. 28 Workplace rules that ignore the familial obligations
of employees prevent women from fully participating in the public
sphere. While lack of accommodations for child care is ostensibly gender
neutral, in actuality it is not, given the reality of women's responsibility

for child care.129 Similarly, requirements that employees spend forty

tion, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. (1977) (equal protection violations can be found when uneven discriminatory impact is accompanied by factors more susceptible to proof than intentional discrimination),
123. The Court pointed to the disruption that would result from the invalidation of neutral rules
with disproportionate impact:
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens one race more than another
would be far-reaching and would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be
more burdensome to the poor and the average blacks than to the more affluent whites.
426 U.S. at 248.
124. Id. at 238-41.
125. See, eg., McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3199 (1987); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
126. Brodin, The Standard of Causationin the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy
Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292, 321-23 (1982); Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 36-48; Karst, The
Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163, 1165 (1978); Note, Discriminatory
Purposeand Mens Rea: The TorturedArgument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L. J. I11,124-25, 126 n.
89 (1983); Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and Equal Protection
Law, 92 YALE L. J. 328, 336 (1982).
127. The cases where plaintiffs have met this burden are rare. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222 (1985); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). For a recent criticism of the difficulties of proving intent see Thornburg v. Gingles, 476 U.S. 30 (1986). And unless the gender classification is overt, no amount of adverse impact on women will suffice to establish intent. Personnel
Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278 (1979). See infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
128. Finley, supra note 2, at 1142, 1148, 1152-59; Krieger & Cooney, supra note 2, at 515, 544-47.
129. Frug, supra note 46, at 56-61; Taub, supra note 30, at 383.
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hours or more per week "on the job"130 and that their careers be uninterrupted are not in reality gender neutral. 3 1 A society that defines an ideal
worker as one who can always place work life before private obligations
forces women to choose between the world of business and politics and
the world of home and family.132 Although such a dilemma thwarts the
achievement of equality, discrimination law permits it. For example, the
Supreme Court finds no discrimination in a workplace structure that
33
does not accommodate child care responsibilities.
In many jobs, the criteria for success, although couched in gender
neutral terms, reflect male experiences.13 4 For example, women are often
penalized for failing to act as aggressively as men. 135 The validity of this
criteria is not considered to be within the proper purview of discrimination law. 136 The inquiry in employment discrimination cases is limited to
plaintiff's qualifications for the job; it does not extend to whether the job
can also be performed by a plaintiff with different qualifications. This
approach denies the diversity which a meaningful vision of equality
requires.
At first blush, it appears that the use of more subjective criteria in
employment decisions might alleviate this homogeneity. But because women are seldom in positions of power, subjective criteria often reflect
male biases and values. 37 Thus women's attributes and contributions
130. Chamallas, supra note 101, at 722, 725-26; Frug, supra note 46, at 56-61.
131. U.S. COMM'N ON Civ. RTS., COMPARABLE WORTH: AN ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 70 0985) (blaming the male-female wage gap on women who choose to work intermittently).
Human capital theorists use the same approach. See Equal Pay, supra note 101, at 135-37.
132. For an example of the lengths women are advised to go to conform to the roles played by

men, see S. STAUTBERG,

PREGNANCY NINE TO FIVE: THE CAREER WOMAN'S GUIDE TO PREG-

AND MOTHERHOOD 133-34 0985). The book describes one woman, in particular, as worthy
of emulation because while she was bedridden due to pregnancy complications, she "renegotiated a
$2.5 million health insurance program and interviewed about twenty job applicants - shoeless and
sitting up in her rented hospital bed, but otherwise looking extremely professional in a tailored navy
blue suit, pantyhose and makeup."
133. Cf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (indicating that an employer can
refuse to hire individuals burdened by child care). In Martin Marietta the Court went further and
suggested that an employer can maintain a non-gender neutral rule, overtly discriminating against
women, if the employer can demonstrate that women have greater child care burdens which interfere
with their job performance. Id. at 544.
134. For an analysis of the male orientation of the language we use, see D. SPENDER, MAN
MADE LANGUAGE 64-67, 138-144 0980).
135. See, eg., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1307-1315 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Ironically, in one case a plaintiff was criticized by employers for acting too agressively and not being
sufficiently "feminine". Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
136. Furuco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 0978); McDonnell-Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01, 806 0973).
137. Tenure decisions usually involve the application of subjective criteria. Although in Watson
NANCY
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continue to be denigrated.
Indeed, often ostensibly gender neutral rules serve to benefit men.

But the gender bias of our culture is so deeply entrenched that these
practices are viewed as either benefitting the entire society or simply re-

flecting the natural order. For example, military leave-which primarily
benefits men-is defined as critical to the public interest, 138 but pregnancy leave is characterized as special treatment for women. 139

The intent requirement of discrimination law shields the bias inherent in such facially gender neutral practices. For example, in Personnel

Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 4° the Court chastised the
plaintiff for failing to prove that the purpose of the Massachusetts veter-

ans preference statute was to discriminate against women. At issue in
Feeney was an absolute life time civil service preference for veterans. The
District Court had found that this preference impacted so inevitably and
severely on women that its disciminatory effect could not be unintended:
The decision to grant a preference to veterans was of course 'intentional'.
So, necessarily, did an adverse impact upon nonveterans follow from that
decision. And it cannot seriously be argued that the legislature of Massav. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988), the Supreme Court permitted a plaintiff to
use Title VII to attack subjective employment criteria, women generally have been unsuccessful in
their challenges to allegedly biased tenure decisions. See, e.g., Zahorik v. Cornell University, 729
F.2d 85, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1984) (where female plaintiff was denied tenure, a faculty member who
abstained from tenure vote described her as "too 'feminine' in that she was too 'unassuming, unaggressive, unassertive and not highly motivated for vigorous interpersonal competition.' "); Laborde
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 686 F.2d 715, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1982) (although female plaintiff has published "four books of scholarly criticism .... two books of poetry, and numerous articles and book
reviews, and had read several papers at academic conventions.., her scholarship did not meet the
University's high standards of academic excellence .. "); Faro v. N. Y. Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231
(2d Cir. 1974) ("the proof clearly shows that the experience possessed by such male professors as
have been hired is not comparable to the limited teaching and research [experience of the female
plaintiff]"). But see Sweeny v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1978).
For an interesting discussion of the relationship between subjective employment criteria and discrimination, see Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places,95 HARv. L. REV. 947 (1982).
138. Employers are required to provide leave for military service. 5 U.S.C. § 6323 (1976). Sev-

erastates provide similar protection for those leaving work to participate in military service. See
CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 394.5 (West 1955 & Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 115.01 (West
1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 129, § 501 (Smith-Hurd 1953 & Supp. 1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
149, § 52A (Law Co-Op. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 38A:44 (West 1968); N.Y. MILITARY LAW
§ 243 (McKinney 1953 & Supp. 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5903.02) (Page 1977 & Supp.
1985); 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302 (Purdon 1969); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 114 (Purdon

1959 & Supp. 1985); TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-4a (Vernon 1970 & Supp. 1986). But see
White v. Associated Indus. of Ala., Inc., 373 So. 2d 616 (Ala. 1979) (Alabama military leave statute
violates due process and impairment of contracts provisions of Alabama Constitution).
139. Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n of Mo., 479 U.S. 511 (1987); California
Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerre, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
140. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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chusetts could have been unaware that most veterans are men. It would
thus be disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of this legislation
for women were unintended, in the sense 1that
4 1 they were not volitional or in
the sense that they were not foreseeable.
While conceding that the foreseeability of the consequences has
some "bearing" upon the existence of discriminatory intent, 4 2 the
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs failed to prove intent. It seems that

nothing short of an overt and complete exclusion of women on the face of
the statute would have established the requisite state of mind.

Clearly, the Court was unable or unwilling to perceive the bias inherent in a regime which offered veterans' benefits while denying

mothers' benefits. The status quo was sanctioned as the norm; and worare instance where they could
men were entitled to relief only in the
43
prove a particular malevolent intent.'

The pregnancy cases similarly demonstrate the Court's blindness to
the disparate effect of seemingly gender neutral rules. 144 Policies which

do not provide pregnancy benefits are based on a model where the lack of
pregnancy is the norm. Pregnancy is seen as a voluntary deviation from

that model. Assuming as the Court does, that pregnancy is merely a matter of private choice, 145 however, echoes the simplistic notion that statutes which regulated the workplace interfered with workers' absolute

voluntary freedom of contract.146 The characterization of pregnancyand childcare-as voluntary is a similar attempt to deny benefits to wo-

men under the guise of protecting their freedom. The Lochner court has
been justifiably criticized for perpertuating class bias under the banner of

freedom.47 The Geduldig insistence that pregnancy is voluntary 148 per141. Id. at 278.
142. Id. at 279, n. 25. The Supreme Court noted that the District Court found that the absolute
preference had "a devastating impact upon the employment opportunities of women," and that a
"more modest preference formula would readily accommodate the State's interest in aiding veterans.. " Id. at 260.
143. Ironically, the intent requirement may well protect legislation that benefits women from
fourteenth amendment attack. For example, legislation requiring employers to provide maternity
leave for female workers who choose to leave work for childbirth may well withstand a fourteenth
amendment challenge by male workers who would be unable to prove the requisite subjective intent.
See infra text accompanying notes 174-85.
144. Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n of Mo., 479 U.S. 511 (1987); General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
145. See supra note 116.
146. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
147. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 436-55 (1978).
148. Pregnancy is hardly voluntary. It is essential to the continuation of the species. Moreover,
many women are unable to choose not to bear a child. See infra text accompanying notes 33249.
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petuates gender bias within the rubric of freedom of choice. Thus by rely-

ing on the supposed voluntariness of pregnancy, the Court is able to
frame the issue as one of individual culpability. This individualistic per-

spective isolates women plaintiffs from the context of their reality, and
thereby seems to delegitimize their claims.
B.

Title VII Doctrine

The insulation of seemingly neutral practices harmful to women extends not only to equal protection law, but also to doctrine developed
under the antidiscrimination statutes. To be sure, the first Supreme Court
interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,149 Griggs v.

Duke Power Co., i s° embraced the "effects only" approach. The Court
understood that requiring proof of discriminatory intent was inconsistent

with the language and purpose of Title VII. 151
Griggs notwithstanding, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,'5 2

the Court retreated from this position, formulating a second version of
the Title VII prima facie case, which requires that plaintiff prove defend-

ant's improper motivation. I3 There are thus two judicially created models for the Title VII prima facie case: disparate impact (Griggs) and
disparate treatment (McDonnell Douglas). Although neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of Title VII supports this bifurcation, 54 the Court has consistently adhered to these constructs.' 5 By
reading a subjective intent requirement into disparate treatment cases
under Title VII'5 6 and by placing the burden of proving it on the plain149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1982).
150. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
151. The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of
the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 429-30.
152. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
153. Accord United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983);
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1313-22 (1983) (collecting cases). For a good discussion of how the Court has used the element of pretext, see Bartholet, ProofofDiscriminatoryIntent
Under Title VIL" United StatesPostalService Board v. Aikens, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1206 (1982).
154. For a particularly thoughtful discussion see Brodin, supra note 126, at 294-99.
155. For a good overview, see International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 358-61 (1977).
156. Green is thus a breach of the Court's promise in Washington v. Davis, that proof of intent
would be limited to fourteenth amendment cases. Moreover, the Court has extended the intent re-

1987]

THE FAILURE OF GENDER EQUALITY

tiff, the Court has dramatically departed from the definition of discrimination endorsed in Griggs. In Griggs, the Court saw its task as
eliminating the impact of "built-in headwinds" 15 7 and other societal impediments to equality. In the disparate treatment cases, the Court limits
its task to ensuring that defendant articulates an ostensibly neutral rea15 8
son for its behavior.

The Court has further undercut the thrust of Griggs by blurring the
distinction between the two models. It has applied the disparate treatment model-and its requirement that plaintiffs prove intent-to paradigmatic Griggs cases. 15 9 The choice of model is often outcome
determinative.
The comparable worth cases illustrate this.1 60 Generally, in these
cases, female plaintiffs challenge the lower wages paid to workers in fe-

male dominated jobs which are demonstrably similar in job content, responsibility, or training, to higher paid male dominated jobs. The courts

have forced comparable worth claimants to follow the disparate treat1 61
ment model and prove defendant's specific intent to pay women less.
Defendants typically argue that they are merely using neutral market
rates to set wages. Plaintiffs contend that market rates are discriminatory

quirement to other antidiscrimination statutes. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n of New
York, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983) (proof of discriminatory intent required to receive compensatory
relief for Title VI violation); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 388-89
(1982) (discriminatory intent required to show a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981). No case raising this
issue with respect to Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, has yet
reached the Supreme Court but the circuit courts are engaged in a lively debate about whether proof
of intent is required for Title VIII violations. See, eg., Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) (evidence
of intent a critical factor); Hanson v. Veterans' Administration, 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Title VIII requires either proof of intent or showing of significant discriminatory effect; therefore,
intent need not be a factor in establishing Title VIII violations).
157. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
158. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Compare with
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2790 (1988), where Justice O'Connor suggests this approach to defendants in disparate impact cases. In a separate opinion, Justice Blackmun
strongly criticizes this "blind eye to the crucial distinctions" between disparate impact and disparate
treatment. Id. at 2793.
159. .In Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the Court applied the McDonnell
Douglasmodel to a situation which clearly involved the racially disparate impact of a neutral hiring
practice equally applicable to black and white applicants. The Furnco opinion did not even consider
disparate impact analysis, which would have compelled a different result.
160. See Equal Pay, supra note 101. But see Weiler, The Wages ofSex: The Uses and Limits of
Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. Rnv. 1728 (1986).
161. Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 703 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036
(1984).
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because they incorporate gender biased wage rates. 162 Market rates are
indeed facially neutral rules that adversely affect women-precisely the
situation which should trigger disparate impact analysis. Yet, the courts
have not only rejected 163 impact analysis but also have been unwilling to
infer intent from the defendants' reliance on market disparities in wages
and statistical evidence of male/female wage differentials.'64 As now Justice, then Judge, Kennedy wrote for the Ninth Circuit in AFSCME v.
Washington:
The inference of discriminatory motive which AFSCME seeks to draw
from the State's participation in the market system fails, as the State did not
create the market disparity and has not been shown to have been
165 motivated
by impermissible sex based consideration in setting salaries.
1 66
This approach, of course, maintains the status quo.
Williams argues that disparate effects analysis is the "doctrinal
tool.. .to squeeze the male tilt out of a purportedly neutral legal structure. ' 167 What Williams does not see is that the disparate effects test
offers little to women.' 68 Her-analysis requires the Court to recognize
that facially neutral rules adversely affect women and discriminate on the

162. See, eg., American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d
1401 (9th Cir. 1985); Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686. But see Coming Glass Works v.
Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) (Equal Pay Act passed to rectify gender biased market).
163. For a criticism of the reason given by the courts for rejecting disparate impact analysis, see
Equal Pay, supra note 101, at 151-56.
164. American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401;
Wilkens v. Univ. of Houston, 654 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 459 U.S. 809
(1982), on remand 695 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1983). But see, Lanegan-Grimm v. Library Ass'n of
Portland, 560 F.Supp. 486 (D. Or. 1983) ; Briggs v. City of Madison, 536 F.Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis.
1982); Taylor v. Charley Brothers, 25 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 602 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 448 F.Supp. 1168 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
165. American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees, 770 F.2d at 1406.
166. The court's concern with remedies in these cases reflects a similar interest. See, e.g.,
Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 706, n.11 ("Courts are not competent to engage in
sweeping revision of market wage rates"); Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 17 F.E.P. Cases 906,
906-07 (D. Colo. 1978), aff'd, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980)
(plaintiff's claim is "pregnant with the possibility of disrupting the entire economic system").
167. Williams, supra note 2, at 331, 333-51, 364. Williams sets forth the general proposition that
"perpetrators of rules with a disparate effect must justify them" as the doctrinal tool for attacking
neutral structures. Id. at 331. Her analysis, however, is actually limited to Title VII. As a general
proposition applicable to constitutional as well as Title VII claims, Williams' statement is seriously
flawed because of the difficulty of proving defendant's discriminatory intent in the constitutional
context.
168. Indeed, although Williams maintains that disparate effects is the key doctrinal tool for
women, she herself enumerates many of its limitations. See, e.g., id. at 374, n.195 (availability of
business necessity defense and the inapplicability of the doctrine where there is no rule to challenge
but only the failure to have a policy); id. at 373 n.190 (difficulty of proving Title VII violations).
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basis of gender.' 6 9 But the abstract individualism of discrimination theory, and its reliance on male experiences, prevents this recognition.
In Gilbert the Court upheld the exclusion of pregnancy benefits because it was a neutral rule, without considering its disparate effect on
women.' 7 ° There is little reason to believe that the Court will be more
sympathetic when considering the disparate effects of nonpregnancy related neutral rules. 17 1 For example, a gender neutral rule prohibiting
employment of parents with primary child care responsibilities is likely
to withstand a Title VII challenge. The Court is apt to view this rule as
one that affects merely those with child care responsibility-both men
and women-notwithstanding the fact that it is usually women who assume the primary role regarding child care, and that such a rule typifies
the "male tilt' 172 of the workplace. What is clear from Gilbert, is that
gender neutral rules whose disparate effect results from the "voluntary"
assumption of traditionally female functions are not now susceptible to a
successful Title VII challenge.' 73 Thus even when applying antidiscrimination statutes, the Court is unable to see beyond the experiences of
men and unable to validate the claims raised by women left alone to face
the demands of family life.
C. Cal. Fed. and Wimberly: Geduldig Redux
Gender equality necessarily requires conditions that support women's familial responsibilities. Under discrimination doctrine these are
susceptible to challenges alleging that men are adversely affected and women unfairly advantaged. Several states have enacted statutes that provide disability leaves to pregnant workers without requiring similar
benefits for disabled male workers. 174 These statutes are examples of the
kinds of accommodation equality demands, yet they are challenged as
discrimination against men because they require "special treatment" for
women.
In Cal. Fed. the Court held that the California pregnancy leave stat169. Id. at 331-32, 345.
170. 429 U.S. at 136-37.
171. See, e.g., Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n of Mo., 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
172. Williams, supra note 2, at 331.
173. Frug, supra note 46, at 61-62.
174. The statutes and similar state regulations are compiled in Dowd, supra note 40, at 722-23
nn.101-02. However, Minnesota, Connecticut and Oregon have recently enacted statutes offering
parental leave to both the father and the mother of a newborn or newly adopted child. At least
twenty-eight other states are currently considering parental leave legislation. N.Y. Times, June 18,
1987, at A20, col. 4.
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ute was not preempted by the PDA. In so holding, Justice Marshall focused on congressional intent 175 and found that in enacting the PDA
Congress intended to prohibit discrimination against women-that is, to
overrule Gilbert, 76 and not to prohibit state pregnancy leave statutes. t77
The focus of concern was pregnancy, not childcare.1 78 Indeed, parts
of Marshall's opinion indicate that he interpreted the PDA as adopting
the biological differences approach. 1 79 Thus, while Marshall suggests that
Congress wished to protect pregnant women against discrimination, he
also suggests that mandatory maternity leaves not closely tailored to the
physical disabilities of pregnancy would violate Title VII. 180 Therefore,
the opinion offers little support for providing the broad range of accommodations necessary for women's equality.
Moreover, the Court's opinion was schizophrenic about the preferential treatment issue. Although Marshall at times appeared to support
accommodation for pregnant women, he also suggested, without deciding, that states may have to provide parallel benefits to men.' 8 1 Thus,
Marshall was careful not to depart completely from the "similar treatment" paradigm.
The "similar treatment" approach was reaffirmed emphatically in
Wimberly v. Labor and IndustrialRelations Commission of Missouri.8 2
Wimberly involved a Missouri statute which denied unemployment compensation to those who left work "voluntarily without good cause attributable to his [sic] work or to his [sic] employer."' 8 3 Petitioner, who was
on pregnancy leave pursuant to a policy that she would be rehired only if
there was a position available when she was ready to return to work, filed
a claim for unemployment benefits when her employer informed her that
there were no positions open. The state denied her benefits, claiming that
under the terms of the state statute, she had voluntarily left without good
175. "In determinig whether a state statute is preempted by federal law... our sole task is to
ascertain the intent of Congress." 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987).
176. Id. at 285.
177. Id. Indeed, Justice Marshall noted that Congress was not only aware of such laws when it
passed the PDA "but apparently did not consider them inconsistent with" that statute. Id. at 287.
178. Id. at 292. Justice Stevens, concurring in part, characterized Justice Marshall's interpretation of the PDA as one which "allows some preferential treatment of pregnancy." Id. at 292.
179. Id. at 290.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 291.
182. 479 U.S. 511 (1987).For an interesting and somewhat different interpretation of Cal.Fed.
and Wimberly see Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreward: Justice Endangered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 17-25 (1987).
183. 479 U.S. at 513.
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cause. At issue was whether the state statute as construed violated a
provision of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act ("FUTA") which forlaw "solely on the basis of
bade the denial of compensation under state
18 4
pregnancy."'
of
termination
or
pregnancy
The Court held that the Missouri statute was consistent with the
federal statute because FUTA did not mandate preferential treatment for
women but only prohibited states from singling out pregnancy for unfavorable treatment. The Court characterized the Missouri statute as a
"neutral rule that incidentally disqualified pregnant or formerly pregnant
claimants."""5
In its unwillingness to recognize the obvious gender bias of characterizing rules about pregnancy as neutral, Wimberly echoed the discredited reasoning of Geduldig and Gilbert. Although the Court recognized
that Congress intended to eliminate "discriminatory disqualifications because of pregnancy,"' 8 6 the Court was unable to see the clear discriminatory effect of the application of the Missouri statute in this case. The
opinion is further flawed by its restrictive interpretation of FUTA. Under
the opinion, FUTA prohibits a state statute that specifically enumerates
pregnancy as a disqualification. But where the state applies a general (or
"neutral") requirement that is interpreted to include pregnancy, FUTA
is not violated. The Court relied on the word "solely" as a justification
for this excessively formalistic approach.' 8 7
Read together, Cal. Fed. and Wimberly are anomalous. There are
two congressional enactments speaking to a single goal: the prohibition
of discrimination based on pregnancy. In Cal. Fed. the Court simply
avoided the issue of the disparate effect of the statute but recognized a
congressional intent to prohibit penalizing women for pregnancy. In
Wimberly, however, the Court allowed pregnant women to be penalized
by returning to notions of discrimination which ignore the social context
and effects of certain policies.
Indeed, in Wimberly, the Court abandoned the analysis of congressional intent that determined the outcome of Cal. Fed. Instead, the Court
disregarded the broader purposes of the FUTA prohibition against disqualifying pregnant women and interpreted the word "solely" to submerge any obvious overall congressional intent to protect pregnant
184.
185.
186.
187.

26 U.S.C. § 3304 (a) (12) (1975).
479 U.S. at 517.
Id. at 520. (Citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-755, at 50) (emphasis added by Court).
Id. at 516, 517, 522.
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women. This judicial tunnel vision is yet another aspect of the limitations
of discrimination law.
In Washington v. Davis, Feeney, Geduldig, and Wimberly, the Court
was unable to see beyond linguistic neutrality to the institutional inequality resulting from state policy. These cases disavow any judicial responsibility to undo or dismantle racial or gender inequality. Instead they limit
culpability to particular defendants who engage in overt, nonneutral, specific race or gender motivated acts or language. Without a specific culpa88
ble defendant there can be no violation.1
The jurisprudence of Geduldig, Washington v. Davis and Wimberly
defines discrimination as aberrant, asocial, atomized behavior. This view
not only denigrates women's claims by suggesting that the circumstances
leading to a claim are the woman's own fault, but also severely limits the
law's ability to achieve gender equality.
D. Denying History and Social Context
By viewing discrimination as isolated, privatized malfeasance, discrimination law ignores both the social and historical context in which it
occurs. 8 9 The irrelevance of social context is a pervasive theme of both
the race discrimination' and sex discrimination cases. For example, if
pregnancy is voluntary, as the Court frequently assumes, it follows that
any disadvantage resulting from pregnancy is solely the responsibility of
the woman because she has chosen the pregnancy. This is the clear import of Wimberly. Suggesting that pregnancy is always voluntary, however, denies reality. Rape persists, contraception is not foolproof, and
neither it nor abortion is free. t"' Women's financial dependency on men
limits their freedom to choose not to bear children.
The Court's view of pregnancy also perpetuates the ideology of separate public and private spheres. If traditionally private (and female) functions are "voluntary" and serve no public purpose, discrimination claims
188. The same ideology is reflected in the pregnancy cases. Since the court is unable to find a
perpetrator other than nature, it is not considered discriminatory when women are penalized for
bearing children.
189. See Eisenberg, supra note 122, at 45-50; Schnapper, Perpetuationof PastDiscrimination, 96
HARV. L. REv. 828, 838-39 (1983).
190. The clear message of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was that the
existence of a segregated society could never satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate of equality. This is tantamount to taking judicial notice of the long history of institutionalized racism. Subsequent cases clearly depart from this approach. See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978); Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419
(1977).
191. See infra text accompanying notes 332-51.
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that involve these areas will fail. Yet, obviously, society as a whole de-

mands certain functions which women have historically performed.192

Consider this example: If the critical factor is whether one's action is

voluntary (or based on a private decision), then veterans' benefits to enlistees should also be considered special treatment. After all, the enlistee
chose to serve. Granting the enlistee such benefits is therefore the sort of
preferential treatment that pregnant women have been criticized for demanding. Yet society views benefits for all veterans-both draftees and

volunteers-as serving a non-discriminatory public purpose. It is the
public purpose behind pregnancy which discrimination law ignores.

Veterans' preference is another example of the judicial discounting
of history.93 In upholding the constitutionality of the Massachusetts absolute veterans' preference statute, the Court recognized the various fed-

eral statutes, regulations and policies which restrict the number of
women who can pursue a military career.' 94 The Court also noted that

women have never been subjected to a military draft. 195 Moreover, the
Court admitted that the impact of the veterans' preference law upon job

opportunities for women has been "severe."' 196 Yet having recited this
history the Court refused to acknowledge its relevance to veterans'
197
preference.

The comparable worth cases' 98 which allow the use of the market
rate defense also exemplify the isolation of specific culpable acts from

historical reality. Courts have refused to view reliance on the market as a
192. For an exhaustive list of wifely tasks see Syfers, I Want a Wife: A FeministClassicfrom the
Early '70s, Ms., Dec. 1979, at 144.
193. The Title VII bona fide seniority system cases are similarly ahistoric when they reject the
argument that any seniority system which perpetuates past discrimination can never be bona fide.
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353 (1977); American Tobacco
Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 75-76 (1982). These cases undercut the thrust of Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (acknowledging relevance of past discrimination). Compare the
various opinions in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), discussing the relevance of pre-Title
VII discriminatory behavior to post-Title VII discriminatory consequences.
194. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1979).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 271.
197. See also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 71-72 (1981). This ostrich-like approach is
particularly ironic given the pre-Feeney cases striking down military policies based on sexist assumptions. E.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
198. American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th
Cir. 1985); Spaulding v. Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984); Lemons v. City and County of
Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980);Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); Gerlach v.
Michigan Bell Tel. Co. 501 F.Supp. 1300 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
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culpable act even though the market is gender-biased,' 99 and Congress
has passed legislation to rectify that situation. 2

°

To be sure, there is a line of Supreme Court opinions which appears
to recognize the relevance of history or social context. These cases typically involve social welfare programs which distribute benefits according
to stereotypical perceptions about the economic roles of men and women;
they involve overt gender classifications rather than the discriminatory

effect of facially gender neutral rules. When the Court disagrees with the
stereotype, the gender classification is struck down as "archaic and overbroad."2 ° t This rubric covers those cases where the stereotype is based on
the "outdated" assumption that women are economically dependent.20 2
On the other hand, equally archaic and overbroad stereotypes have been

upheld when the Court finds that they have been designed to rectify past
discrimination against women. These stereotypes are characterized as

"benign" or compensatory and are thus allowed to stand.20 3
The stereotype cases, however, are not really about social context at

all. Indeed, the only stereotypes which the Court has labelled "archaic"
are those of which the Court no longer approves. Although the Court
' '2 °4
condemns some stereotypes because they are based on "old notions

about the role and abilities of women, it has upheld equally old stereotypes of which it approves. In fact, most of the stereotypes which the

Court condemns as outdated can just as easily be viewed as compensatory. 20 5 Moreover, the Court has endorsed classifications which perpetu-

ate the most blatant sex role stereotypes.20 6 For example, in Rostker v.
199. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974).
200. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
201. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975). That case, however, upheld a gerjder
based classification because it was compensatory and not based on an invalid classification.
202. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (rejecting benefit availability in cases of
father's but not mother's unemployment); Stanton v. Stanton 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (invalidating longer
child support period for males than females); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1974) (striking down survivor benefits available to widows with children but not similarly situated widowers).
203. For example, in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), the Court upheld a property tax
exemption available to widows because they are faced with more financial difficulties and a more
"inhospitable" job market than widowers. Id. at 355. A similar scheme was upheld in Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), where the Court allowed a different calculation of earning years for
women than men because to do so helped to reduce the economic disparity caused by the long
history of sex discrimination against women.
204. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. at 14.
205. Gertner, Bakke on Affirmative Action for Women: Pedestalor Cage, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 173, 183 (1979).
206. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), upholding a gender assignment rule for
prison guards on the grounds that the guard's "very womanhood" would undermine her ability to do
the job. Id. at 335-36.
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607

Goldberg2 7 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a draft registration
law which expressly excluded women. The Court took comfort in the
fact that the decision to exclude women from registration was not an
"accidental by-product"20 8 of traditional stereotypes but a reasonable
policy given the fact that women were excluded from combat. 20 9 But the

Court was oblivious to the underlying sexist assumptions in a law which
excludes women from combat. Moreover, the Court ignored the impact

its decision would have on women as citizens. Given the importance of
military service in our society, exempting women from the draft deni-

grates their status as citizens.21 0 This disparity in citizenship echoes the
discredited perspective of the SlaughterhouseCases,"' which diluted the

concept of national citizenship.
Thus, although the Court occasionally recites the relevance of history, it lacks a full understanding of the context in which discrimination

occurs. Rather than providing a means for understanding how women
have been systematically victimized by society, discrimination law ab-

stracts women from their history, and blames them for their status as
victims. 21 2 It cannot distinguish which differential classifications perpetuate that victimization, and which ones alleviate it.
E. Special Treatment of "'InnocentVictims"
The Court's recent fascination with the rights of "innocent vic-

tims" ' 21 3 is another manifestation of how discrimination law rejects the
21 4
relevance of the "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.

The school desegregation cases were a harbinger of this trend. In Brown,
the victims were the black school children who were forced to attend
207. 453 U.S. at 57 (1981).
208. Id. at 74.
209. Id. at 76-78.
210. Karst, supra note 126, at 55.
211. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
212. This formulation is derived from W. RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM, 28-29 (1971). The
court is not alone in this approach. See R. LESTER, ANTIBIAS REGULATION OF UNIVERSITIES,
(1974) ("Much of what is loosely called sex discrimination in employment is, at least partly, the
consequences of choices made by women . . . ."). Id. at 34. Accord, Sowell, Affirmative Action
Reconsidered, 42 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 47, 63 (1976).
213. See, eg., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353 (1977) ("Title
VII should not outlaw the use of existing seniority and thereby destroy or water down the vested
seniority rights of employees simply because their employer had engaged in discrimination prior to
passage of the Act."); University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (Court refers to
nonminority applicants as "innocent persons"). See Sullivan, Comment: Sins of Discrimination: Last
Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78, passim (1986).
214. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
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racially segregated schools. Later cases postulated new victims: the white
school children who suffer by being bussed to integrated schools. 2 5 Dis-

crimination law's focus on individual culpability apart from the social
context in which subordination occurs compels the conclusion that de-

fendants or third parties who lack invidious intent are the true innocent
victims. Thus, women bringing discrimination suits find their claims being overshadowed by the concern for the plight of the "innocent" victim.

The bona fide seniority system cases exemplify the degree to which the
law sympathizes with those who have benefitted from admittedly racist

and/or sexist seniority systems.216 Although the Court has labelled the
reconciliation of the interests of these victims with the victims of discrim-

ination as a "delicate" task,217 that adjustment is usually made against
women and minorities.2 18
For example, in Fdrd Motor Co. v. EEOC,2 19 the Court held that an

employer could toll the accrual of back pay liability to three successful
female plaintiffs by offering the jobs previously denied them, albeit without retroactive seniority. The Court pointed out that requiring the employer to offer retroactive seniority would place a "particularly onerous

burden ' on the innocent employees who had accrued seniority while
the case was being litigated. This holding ignored the compelling reality
of the desire for job security. The plaintiffs testified that they rejected
Ford's initial reinstatement offer of a job without seniority because of
concern that they might be laid off.22 1 Requiring women who have already proved sex discrimination to accept either a smaller back pay

award or a job without security in order to protect an "innocent" male
employee's job security is a ludicrous application of the antidiscrimina215. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 449 U.S. 870 (1980); Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S.
189, 247-50 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); cf, Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. School District,
467 F.2d 142, 148 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 413 U.S. 920 (1973) (focusing on the interests of the
children who are victims of segregation).
216. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 332-35, 372 (1977);
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 75-76 (1982).
217. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 372.
218. For example, in Teamsters, the Court held that Congress specifically intended that Title
VII not "destroy or water down the vested seniority rights of employees simply because their employer had engaged in discrimination prior to the passage of the Act." 431 U.S. at 353. Any other
result would, according to the Court, subordinate those vested rights to the claims of "pre-Act
discriminatees without seniority." Id. at 354.
219. 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
220. Id. at 239. The dissent aptly characterizes this holding as the Court's "repeated invocation
of and preoccupation with the rights of innocent third parties." Id. at 254 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
221. Id. at 256-57 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
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tion principle.2 22
United Air Lines v. Evans2 2 3 reflects the same philosophy. In that
case a woman flight attendant was fired pursuant to a no-marriage rule,
which was invalidated in subsequent litigation to which she was not a
party.22 4 When she sought reinstatement, the airline hired her as a new
employee but denied her all of the seniority accrued during her prior
service with United. The Supreme Court upheld the denial of seniority
even though male employees (hired after her subsequently illegal termination and prior to her reinstatement) received more seniority than she
did. The import of Evans is clear: victims of discriminatory practices
have only limited rights, while the beneficiaries of racism and gender bias
have vested rights not to be victimized by an antidiscrimination remedy.
This perpetuation of institutionalized racism and sexism in favor of the
rights of third parties is perhaps the ultimate perversion of antidiscrimination law.
F. Affirmative Action

At first blush, it seems that affirmative action may offer more to
women. 22 5 Affirmative action comes closest to predicating a remedy

upon the underlying social problem of discrimination without requiring
proof of individually-caused, perniciously-motivated conduct. Upon
closer examination, however, it becomes clear that affirmative action is

permissible only in very limited circumstances.
The underlying assumption of affirmative action is that remedial,
222. The doctrine of victim specific relief also illustrates the Court's transformation of the victims of discrimination from those burdened by discrimination, to those who might be burdened by
anti-discrimination remedies. Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 750 (1976), limited retroactive seniority to those identifiable applicants who were seeking relief from post-Act hiring discrimination.
Similarly, in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 363-72 (1977), the Court
limited relief to actual specific victims of the post-Act discrimination. Mere membership in a certified plaintiff class was not enough: In order to be awarded retroactive seniority each individual must
prove that the discrimination had a specific impact on him or her. Firefighters Local No. 1784 v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 578-79 (1984).
223. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
224. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971).
225. It is not our purpose to review (or even to cite) the scholarly debate about either the legality or the wisdom of affirmative action. That literature is extensive and explores a wide range of
positions. See, e.g., N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUB-

LIC POLICY (1975); Bell, Bakke, Minority Admissions, and the Usual Priceof Racial Remedies, 67
CAL. L. REV. 3 (1979); Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination,41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 723 (1974); Sandalow, Racial Preferencesin HigherEducation:PoliticalResponsibility and the
JudicialRole, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975); Sullivan, supra note 213.
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short-term efforts will help rectify historical discrimination. However, if

one assumes that familial obligations will remain a characteristic of
American society, something more than a short-term remedial program

is necessary. Affirmative action is aimed at allowing everyone access to
the paid labor market,2 2 6 but it requires everyone to enter that realm on
the terms in which it is currently structured. That is the antithesis of true

equality.
Although the defendant's motivation is not directly at issue in the

affirmative action cases, particularized fault is as critical as in the discrimination cases. 22 7 Many affirmative action cases hold that race or gen-

der conscious relief is not available unless there has been a preexisting
violation of discrimination law.228 "Societal discrimination, without
more, is too amorphous a basis' 22 9 upon which to predicate a remedy.230

To be sure, some cases have upheld carefully tailored affirmative action plans even in the absence of a showing of prior discrimination.2 3 1
226. As Professor Kay has shown, there are fundamental empirical differences between affirmative action in race discrimination cases and sex discrimination cases. Kay, supra note 40, at 60-77. In
race reverse discrimination cases whites never seek the position formerly held by blacks; in gender
bias cases, on the other hand, men may want the rights or privileges formerly held by women. For
example, men may want disability leave comparable to maternity disability leave, or they may want
parenting leave.
227. And as we have seen, the requirement of proof of impermissible motivation before any
defendant can be found liable for discrimination in the post-Washington v. Davis era is really another
way of defining the perpetrator's fault.
228. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) reh'g. denied, 478 U.S. 1014 (1986);
University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294-98, 307-310 (1978). This was made even
clearer by a case decided as this article was going to press. In City of Richmond v. Croson, 57
U.S.L.W. (U.S. Jan. 23, 1989), the Supreme Court struck down a local ordinance setting aside for
minority owned businesses thirty percent of city construction contracts. After Richmond, it is clear
that any state or local affirmative action efforts must be predicated on detailed findings of specifically
identified violations and that the remedies therefor must be narrowly tailored to the findings of prior
discrimination. ("Proper findings in this regard are necessary to define both the scope of the injury
and the extent of the remedy .... Id. at 4143).
229. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. at 276. Wygant is an example of the absurd
lengths to which the Court is willing to go in its search for specificity. Despite the extensive litigation
in that case, the Court refused to find sufficient evidence to support a finding of prior discrimination
by the defendent.
230. Cf.Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 477-78, 484-85 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of a provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 setting aside certain monies for
projects which purchased services and/or supplies from minority owned businesses because Congress does not need the kind of "record" that judges and administrators need.) University of Cal.
Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. at 306 n.43. The Richmond Court distinguished Fullilove on the rather
surprising theory that under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has greater authority to
implement race conscious remedies than the states have under § 1. ("That Congress may identify
and redress the effects of society-wide discrimination does not mean that.., the states.., are free to
decide that such remedies are appropriate." 57 U.S.L.W. at 4138).
231. Johnson v. Transportation Agy., 480 U.S. 616 (1987); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S, 193,
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For example, in Johnson v. TransportationAgency, the Court approved a
voluntary affirmative action plan to "remedy the effects of past practices

and to permit attainment of an equitable representation of minorities,
women and handicapped persons."2' 32 Such cases suggest that affirmative

action can be an effective tool for the woman who is seeking a job in a
category from which women have been traditionally excluded. But even
where an affirmative action plan serves the narrow goal of integrating

previously segregated job classifications, it must be limited. Not only
must there be a "manifest imbalance" relating to a "traditionally segre-

gated job category," but the plan's goals must be based on the number of
women who are qualified rather than the number of women in the labor

market.2 33 Moreover, the plan can only require consideration of "qualified" women; "blind" hiring to rectify numerical imbalances is not
permitted.2 3 4

The efficacy of affirmative action remedies has been further eroded
by the excessive judicial concern for the rights of the potential "innocent

victims" of that remedy, a concern that often overwhelms the rights of
the plaintiffs.2 35 The test seems to be the remedy's impact upon the "innocent victim." Hiring goals are often permitted because their burden "is

diffused to a considerable extent among society generally. 21 36 Layoffs, on
the other hand, "impose the entire burden of achieving... equality on

particular individuals." The key is therefore not the social necessity for
an antidiscrimination remedy but rather a weighing of the injury to the
plaintiffs against a theoretical injury to an undefined class of potential
202-04 (1979). Such voluntary plans must "eliminate manifest racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." Id. at 197. The validity of these holdings is questionable after City of Richmond v. Croson, 57 U.S.L.W. 4132.
232. Johnson v. Transportation Agy., 480 U.S. 616, 620 (1987).
233. Id., at 621.
234. Id. at 622. An affirmative action plan can only "attain" a balanced workforce, but may not
"maintain" one. Id.
235. "[T]here is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent's position to
bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making." University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978). In our view, the disagreement between the various opinions in Bakke
about the level of scrutiny to be applied to racial classifications which potentially victimize members
of the majority race is really a disagreement about how much protection the judiciary owes to white
nonperpetrators. Alan Bakke "bear[s] no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the
[California] special admissions program are thought to have suffered." Id. at 310.
236. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1014 (1986);
Steelworker's v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (plan reserving 50% of openings in a training
program does not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees"). But see University of
Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319 (rejecting a plan reserving openings in medical school class).
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innocent victims. This balancing process consumes the judicial attention
and, indeed, seems to end the inquiry.
At bottom, the affirmative action cases teach once again that a woman's claim is her purely individual problem. The law sees the woman
plaintiff in a bipolar, adversarial posture with the "innocent" male victim. Viewed apart from the larger group of women subject to discrimination 37 and the social context in which it arises, the woman's claim is hers
alone. The full force of the public interest does not stand behind it. The
law does not recognize that so-called private sphere activities are not
merely private or voluntary but serve society as a whole. To the Court,
any "special" treatment to alleviate this burden is not justified. Therefore, protection of the "innocent victim" becomes paramount.
G. The Metaphysics of Process
An emphasis on process rather than result is common to both the
affirmative action cases and the post Geduldig/ Washington v. Davis line
of discrimination cases. The process used to reach a decision is considered significantly more important than the result or impact of that decision. In other words, what is critical is not whether the defendant's
behavior had a discriminatory impact on women or minorities, but rather
whether the process itself was free of subjectively motivated bias. The
question becomes whether the process was applied equally to blacks and
whites, to women and men. If the process was free of intentional racism
or gender bias, the outcome is immune from scrutiny.2 38
Viewed most favorably, these cases are more concerned with decisionmaking free from overt racial or gender considerations than whether
the decision has furthered or hindered racial or gender equality. The
237. Cf Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AEF. 107 passim (1976);
Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1417 passim (1984) (the Constitution protects group
rights). Moreover, this view is reinforced by the Court's denial of societal responsibility for institutionalized racism and its requirements that affirmative action be narrowly tailored in City of Richmond v. Croson, 57 U.S.L.W. 4132.
238. Our criticism does not imply that process is not a critical factor in our jurisprudence in
general or in equality theory in particular. There is a venerable history in Anglo-American jurisprudence of protecting rights not only by guaranteeing the existence of these rights but by guaranteeing
that the process used to deprive rights must be fair. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing,123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,127075 (1975). But the emphasis on process in discrimination law is a far cry from traditional notions of
procedural due process. See Law, supra note 2, at 987-88, 1016-28, for a criticism of the application
of procedural due process to abortion cases. The process-based inquiry of the discrimination cases
concentrates on the methodology of decision-making at the expense of any consideration of its result.
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plaintiff's perspective does not inform the process; instead, the discrimination cases examine the process from the perspective of the defendant 39
In other words, process is not scrutinized
or of the "innocent victim."'
for the purpose of protecting plaintiff's rights but rather for the purpose
of limiting defendant's liability and protecting the rights of potential innocent victims of the remedy. Such an approach stands the concepts of
equality and due process on their heads. For example, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 4 1 the Court
refused to infer that a town might have been motivated by "opposition to
minority groups,"2 4 2 despite extensive evidence of segregation in the area
and the town's exploitation of that segregation. 43 The Court limited its
examination to the process used by the municipality in denying plaintiff's
rezoning request. The Court seemed to assume that as long as the town
did business as ususal, there could be no discrimination. The only process
due to plaintiffs was the same treatment offered to other developers
before the zoning board, thus ignoring the fact that the plaintiffs were in
a very different position from other developers. 244 The Court not only
sacrificed the result to the purity of the process, but it also refused to look
at the process in context.
Elevation of process over result has hurt women and has severely
damaged their quest for equality.2 45 For example, one of the aims of the
reformers advocating no-fault divorce was the abolition of non-neutral
assumptions underlying divorce law, such as women's financial dependency and male support obligations.2 4 6 These reformers created facially
gender neutral rules for no-fault divorce. In this they succeeded.24 7 Nofault divorce created a process treating men and women as similar at the
239. See supra text accompahying notes 119-23.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 213-24.
241. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
242. Id. at 269.
243. But see Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc. 501 F.2d 324, 330-32 (7th Cir. 1974) cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1970 (1974) (upholding the so-called "exploitation theory"). Cf. Clark v. Universal Builders,
Inc., 706 F.2d 204, 210-12, 212 n.8 (7th Cir. 1983) (casting doubt on the viability of the exploitation
theory). For an analysis of the exploitation theory, see Brown, Givelber and Subrin, TreatingBlacks
As If They Were White: Problems ofDefinition and Proofin Section 1982 Cases, 124 U. PA. L. RE. 1,
11-14, 18-20 (1975).
244. Treating low-income housing developers in the same manner as other developers is analogous to the equal treatment approach to sex discrimination. It permits defendants to ignore both the
historical and social contexts and resulting inequity to low income blacks and women.
245. See Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 466-71 (use of standing to impede
women's access to group having equal citizenship rights).
246. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 63, at 31-32.
247. Id. at 31-37, 41-45.
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time of the divorce. But this ignores what Weitzman refers to as the
"structural inequality" between men and women; in fact their economic

situations are radically different.248 The result has been that "while most
divorced men find that their standard of living improves after divorce,

most divorced women and the minor children in their households find
that their standard of living plummets." 24 9 Thus, the illusory promise 25of0
the gender neutral process is belied by the harsh reality of the result.

The reluctance of the judiciary to review faculty tenure decisions is
another example of deference to established facially neutral processes.

Although there are other factors inhibiting judicial examination of those
decisions,25 the cases exemplify a Willingness to accept the validity of
process notwithstanding discriminatory results. In the tenure cases, de-

fendant universities typically cite plaintiff's failure to meet high standards for scholarship as a nondiscriminatory reason for denial of tenure.

Plaintiffs have difficulty in showing that the subjective evaluation of
scholarly work was motivated by gender bias.25 2 As long as the same
procedural steps are applied to male and female candidates, the courts
are unwilling to question the results of the procedure. Indeed, the courts
have enshrined the tenure process and have virtually immunized it from

discrimination claims. Thus once again, discrimination law ignores the
context in which inequality occurs.
248. Id. at 35. She is, of course, referring to the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victimized by discrimination in the labor market and that women are more likely to be restricted by
child care responsibilities. Weitzman also notes that typically women's career prospects have been
diminished by marriage and the different sex roles filled by husbands and wives during that marriage.
Id. at 36.
249. Id. at 323.
250. Another example of overdeference to process is the Court's unwillingness to look behind
the Congressional decision to exclude women from draft registration because this decision was not
an "accidental by-product" of traditional sex role stereotypes but rather a "studied choice." Rostker
v. Goldberg 453 U.S. 57, 72, 74 (1981); See also Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
274-80 (1979).
251. Bartholet, supra note 137, at 983-98.
252. See, eg., Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1984) (tenure selection criteria
legitimately related to job notwithstanding claim of subjectivity); Laborde v. Regents of the Univ. of
California, 686 F.2d 715, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1173 (1983) (plaintiff unable to
show pretext notwithstanding her publication of four books of scholarly criticism, two volumes of
poetry and numerous articles and reviews). But see Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3rd
Cir. 1980) (upholding close judicial supervision of remedy in tenure case); Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106, 112-13 (Ist Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980)
(evidence showed that women faculty "were evaluated by a stricter standard than their male colleagues and that the institution generally was unresponsive to the concerns of its female faculty.");
see Taub, supra note 39, at 349-61 for an interesting discussion of the effect of attitudinal factors
concerning gender on employment decisions.
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H. Affirmative Duty
The approach to institutionalized prejudice reflected in Geduldig,
Feeney, and Washington v. Davis illustrates the severe constrictions of
discrimination law. A woman's right to equality is no more than a right
to compete with men, and the rules of this competition are male.
This limited focus puts to rest any notion that there is an affirmative
duty on government to eliminate institutional sexism and racism. The
strongest support for the existence of such a duty appears in Green v.
County School Board.2" 3 Under Green, merely refraining from futher discriminatory acts is tantamount to acquiescing in segregated schools and
this acquiescence, without more, violates the fourteenth amendment.25 4
Green imposed a duty on government to take affirmative steps to rectify
inequality and to achieve equality.2"' Yet, although Green has never been
overruled (and is still occasionally cited with approval),2 56 it is clear that
its precedential value is very limited.25 7
The various opinions in Bazemore v. Friday25 8 reflect the Justices'
disagreement about the existence of an affirmative duty. Bazemore involved several issues arising out of alleged race discrimination by the
North Carolina Educational Extension Service. Justice White, concurring, opined that Green had no application beyond school desegregation.2" 9 Justice Brennan, dissenting in part, criticized White for
"winking" at the constitutional requirement that states have an obligation to eliminate the last vestiges of segregation. 260 According to Brennan, defendants have an affirmative duty to eliminate the effects of de
jure segregation that is not predicated upon evidence of specific acts of
discrimination. Nor is this duty satisfied simply by refraining from further segregation and declaring a neutral policy for future activities. Fulfillment of the duty requires active and not passive measures.26 1
253. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Cf Shannon v. U.S. Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809,
820-21 (3d Cir. 1970).
254. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
255. Id.
256. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458-59 0979).
257. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,419-21(1977) (defendant's duty limited
to refraining from incremental segregative effects of its behavior); Milliken v. Bradley, 413 U.S. 717,
745-46 (1973) (no duty to achieve equality in the absence of proof that school district boundaries
"were established for the purpose of creating, maintaining or perpetuating segregation of races.") Id.
at 748.
258. 476 U.S. 385 0986).
259. Id. at 408.
260. Id. at 409.
261. Id. at 414-20.
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The majority's rejection of Brennan's position is hardly surprising.
The concepts of intent and affirmative duty are intimately connected.2 6 3 Restricting constitutional violations to behavior involving
specific malevolent intent limits governmental responsibility to refraining
from those specific acts which constitute purposeful discrimination.
Predicating constitutional violations upon a breach of an affirmative duty
requires that defendants take positive acts to achieve equality.
The absence of an affirmative duty to rectify gender inequality limits
both the definition of sex discrimination and the remedies available for it.
A defendant has no duty to modify conditions to enable women to participate equally with men. For example, in upholding draft registration
for men only, the Court effectively held that the government has no affirmative duty to promote gender equality in the armed services. 2" Similarly, the pregnancy cases clarify that there is no affirmative duty to
provide benefits to pregnant women.2 65
Nor does Title VII impose any affirmative duty to achieve equality.
The Supreme Court cases clearly limit its scope to equality of access and
do not extend it to equality of achievement.2 66 In other words, the Title
VII defendant has no affirmative duty beyond refraining from discrete,
perniciously motivated acts of gender bias. In Phillipsv. Martin Marietta
Corp. 267 the Court implied that an employer could refuse to hire women
with pre-school age children if the record demonstrated that some women have family responsibilities that interfere with job performance. An
employer has no duty to provide day care, or flexible hours, or make any
accommodation to the needs of working parents.2 68 Similarly, in Dothard
262

262. In Crawford v. Board of Educ. of the City of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 535 (1982), the
Supreme Court recognized that under a state constitution a school board might have a greater duty
than under the federal constitution.
263. In Washington v. Davis, the Court overruled several lower court opinions which had suggested that it was not necessary to prove discriminatory purpose. Many of these cases recognized an
affirmative duty on the part of government to correct inequality and to administer programs in a way
that affirmatively addresses the needs of minorities. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45
n.12 (1976).
264. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 80 (1981).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 115, 174-87 and infra text accompanying notes 335-37.
266. Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (Title VII does not
obligate an employer to select a woman or member of a minority group from among equally wellqualified applicants); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978) (Title VII
does not obligate an employer to maximize the number of women and minority employees).
267. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
268. Frug, supra note 46, at 56, 94. Thus, as Littleton states, the Court in Martin Marietta
"presupposes the legitimacy of the employment structure itself." Littleton, supra note 2, at 1053.
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V.Rawlinson,2 69 the Court allowed the Alabama prison system to refuse
to hire women guards because of the "barbaric and inhumane" condi-

tions in the Alabama prisons.270 Despite Alabama's duty to operate the
prison system in accordance with the Eighth Amendment,2 7 it did not
have a duty to correct prison conditions to facilitate employment of
women.

27 2

Although the Supreme Court recognized in MeritorSavings Bank v.
Vinson 2 73 that sexual harassment violated Title VII,2 74 it is clear that the
employer has no affirmative duty to provide a workplace free from sexual
harassment. Although Justice Rehnquist specifically declined to rule on
the appropriate standard for employer liability, he noted that there are
"some limits" on the scope of this liability and that the Court of Appeals
was incorrect in ruling that employers are always "automatically liable"
for sexual harassment by supervisors whether
or not the employer knew
2 75
misconduct.
that
of
known
have
or should
The existence of an affirmative duty depends upon an ideology assigning to society the responsibility for curing institutionalized discrimination. But discrimination law is predicated upon an ideology absolving
society of this responsibility. Therefore, the only duty which any defendant has is to stop committing those violations which he or she actually
intended to cause actionable injuries. This individualistic perspective
269. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
270. Id. at 342 (Marshall, J., concurring).
271. Id. Other states have successfully employed women guards. Id. at 341. Some courts have
required that prisons accommodate or even enhance the employment rights of women guards. See,
e.g., Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1985); Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954, 960
(7th Cir. 1983).
272. Nor is there an affirmative duty to maintain a safe workplace in industries where workers
are exposed to hazardous substances known to cause or suspected of causing adverse reproductive
health effects. Employers have typically responded to workplace hazards by developing policies excluding pregnant or fertile women from the workplace rather than by providing a safe workplace.
Male employees also affected by the chemicals are usually not excluded. Many courts have found
that these single-sex exclusionary policies violate Title VII. See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial
Hospital, 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Zuniga
v. Kleberg County Hospital, 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982). Other employers have forced women to
choose between sterility and employment. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v. American Cyanamid
Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See Furnish, PrenatalExposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The Dilemma of the 1978 PregnancyAmendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
676 IowA L. REV. 63 (1980); Williams, Firingthe Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliationof
FetalProtection with Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981).
273. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
274. Id. at 62.
275. Id. at 64. Cf College-Town v. Massachusetts. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 400 Mass.
156, 165-67, 508 N.E.2d 587, 592-94 (1987).
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leaves women with no meaningful remedies: the law effectively sanctions
the disparities extant in society.
IV.

THE LIMITATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS

Discrimination law is unable to provide meaningful gender equality.
The doctrine that has evolved relies on an ostensibly neutral, formalistic
analysis, making it incapable of recognizing or responding to the needs of
women.
The implications of the law's blindness are profound. Discrimination law's insistence on similar treatment for those similarly situated prevents it from responding to the claims of women who are differently
situated from men.276 Thus, discrimination law cannot value the diversity which is so crucial to women's equality. Women suffer as a result,
but so does society as a whole, which loses the enrichment of a more
varied and multifaceted set of norms.27 7 Similarly, the ahistorical, ab-

stract nature of discrimination law, and its reliance on a fault-based principle,27 effectively prevents the recognition of society's role in creating
and perpetuating women's economic dependence.2 79 More fundamentally, discrimination doctrine fails to recognize the interdependence of
women and society.
The limitations of discrimination law should not be surprising. They
merely reflect the more general failure of constitutional jurisprudence to
achieve a vision of equal citizenship.
A.

The Negative Constitution

The claim for equality is in essence a claim for an entitlement to
resources and respect. It is a claim for a right to economic security (at
least at some minimal level), and the economic and legal means to maintain certain values and engage in certain previously undervalued activities, such as caregiving and childrearing. Ultimately, these claims are not
made against particular defendants who have committed malfeasance,
but against the community as a whole. But, as long as the obligation is
276. See supra text accompanying notes 112-19.
277. See, eg., Karst, supra note 245, at 486-96 (adding women's perspective will broaden the
constitutional horizon); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication,

72 VA. L. REV. 543, 580-93 (1986) (women have a different perspective that can reinfuse a classical
perspective into our jurisprudence). Scales emphasizes the importance of a different perspective, but
stresses that women's values cannot be simply "incorporated onto" the dominant approach. See
Scales, supra note 54, at 1382, 1391.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 119-48.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 59-83.
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limited to particular wrongdoers, the scope of equality becomes trivialized, and the critical connection between the condition of women, and of
society at large, becomes lost.
The recognition that gender equality entails, indeed requires, certain
obligations from the community, provides a clue as to why discrimination doctrine cannot remedy problems of gender inequality. To redress
gender inequality, society must be willing to restructure its baseline
norms and expectations to accept and make room for the life experiences
of women. Yet because of the very fact that women's experiences are
devalued by the predominant ideology of the public sphere, this claim is
seen as a request for some special protection, or affirmative assistance,
from the state. As such, it is seen as inconsistent with the dominant vision of constitutional law.
Prevailing constitutional jurisprudence holds that the Constitution
incorporates a liberal, individualistic theory of government.280 Under this
view, the founders were influenced by English liberal theorists such as
John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, 28 1 and conceived of the individual as
existing prior to, and as the primary constituent of the state.282 The most
important function of government is to preserve the peace and protect
property.2 83 However, a potential danger exists that government will exceed its limited role and trample upon the prior, natural rights of the
individual. Thus the essential freedom that was preserved by the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and later the Fourteenth Amendment,2 8 4 was
freedom from governmental impingement on the rights of individuals.2 8 5
This freedom is believed to be in sharp opposition to the "positive" right
to governmental assistance.
In recent years, there has been considerable scholarly debate over
whether the framers actually adopted a liberal, individualistic political
theory or were in fact deeply influenced by a contrasting republican vi280. See Black, FurtherReflections on the ConstitutionalJustice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1103, 1112 (1986); Karst, supra note 245, at 486-87.
281. LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON LOCKE'S POLITICAL IDEAS 1 (Schochet ed.
1971); L. HARTz, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 78-86 (1955).
282. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 227 (. Madison) (Modem Library ed.); id. at 145 (A. Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 8 (J. Jay) (Modem Library ed.).
283. J. LOCKE supra note 78, at 428; T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 314-15 (MacPherson ed. 1968).
284. This view was most clearly evident in cases such as Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 5657 (1905), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 11 (1915), which viewed the Fourteenth Amendment
as a protector of freedom of contract and property.
285. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977). See also Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributionsof the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-RightsAnalysis
and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721 (1981).
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sion emphasizing civic values and the public good over individualism.2 86
Recently, legal theorists have attempted to incorporate a republican
strand into constitutional jurisprudence.28 7 However, regardless of the
proper resolution of the debate, it is clear that the belief that the framers
were influenced by the liberal tradition has had a profound effect on constitutional jurisprudence.2 88 This can be seen most vividly in the laissezfaire ideology animating the Lochner era court.2 89 The demise of Lochner
hardly expunged that view.
At first blush, the question is whether the Constitution mandates
only rights against coercion by the government, which have been called

negative rights, or whether it recognizes affirmative entitlements against
society, that is, so-called positive rights. 290 This question has arisen most
recently in the fundamental rights branch of fourteenth amendment law.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases
286. See, e.g., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967); J.G.A. POPCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION, 506-52 (1975); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 39-45 (1985). Even if the framers were unreconstructed
Lockeans, the more critical question for purposes of equal protection jurisprudence is the vision held
by the 39th Congress that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment. Clearly, the Congress that enhanced
federal power in order to implement the abolition of slavery did not endorse a pure libertarian state.

See Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Forward:EqualCitizenship Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1977); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (Fourteenth

Amendment embodies a principle of equal citizenship). Nevertheless, the Court treats the Fourteenth Amendment as if it embodies the individualistic philosphy that the Court attributes to the
original framers. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 287, 316 (1980); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
10-11 (1964).
287. E.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term Foreward-TracesofSelf Government, 100
HARV. L. REV. 4 passim (1986); Sherry, supra note 277, passim; Sunstein, supra note 286, at 68-75.
Interestingly, both Michelman and Sherry see a close relationship between republican values and
those values long associated with women. Michelman, Traces of Self Government, supra at 17 n.68;
Sherry, supra note 277, passim.
288. Sherry, supra note 277 at 543. See MacKinnon, supra note 65, at 644 (1983) ("The state is
male in the feminine sense.").
289. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Even in the Lochner era, the Court never
adopted a purely individualistic jurisprudence. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (upholding police power restrictions on liberty). Moreover the Court approved restrictions on
contract predicated on stereotypical views about the roles of the sexes. See Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908).

290. Professor Fried, borrowing from the Kantian tradition, has developed a theory of positive
and negative rights in which negative rights are founded on absolute categorical imperatives. C.
FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110-63 (1978). Positive rights, in contrast, are less absolute and require
balancing the rights of individuals. Fried's definition is very different than our own. Nevertheless, his
insight that positive rights require balancing is exemplified by the generally held belief that positive
rights are somehow more difficult to define and manage. See infra text accompanying notes 304-09.
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which suggested that perhaps the state has an affirmative obligation to
provide certain minimal benefits.
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections29 1 is a good example. In
Harper the question was the constitutionality of Virginia's poll tax for
state elections. The Court found that the tax violated the equal protection clause. The Court stated that although the right to vote in state elections is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, it is a "fundamental
political right" because it is preservative of other rights.292 In addition,
the Court found the poll tax to be an invidious classification because it
predicated suffrage on the basis of wealth.29 3 Finally, the Court noted
that "notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the
Equal Protection Clause do change."2' 94
The Court's reasons evoked an expansive vision of equality and substantive entitlements. The declaration that suffrage was a fundamental
right suggested that there were certain entitlements which were so basic
that their allocation could not be left to legislative discretion. Doctrinally, this evolved into a mandate that states demonstrate a compelling
interest when they infringe on such rights.2 95 Theoretically, it suggested
that the Court was adopting a notion of welfare rights which could potentially presage a recognition of individual entitlements to social resources.2 96 In addition, the Court's statements about the
inappropriateness of wealth as a classification hinted that poverty might
be a suspect classification. This would have had dramatic implications
for issues of economic security. And, the majority's insistence that equal
protection law reflect changing values suggested a flexible approach to
the Constitution that protected contemporary egalitarian values.2 97
Cases such as Shapiro v. Thompson 298 and Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa,2 99 seemed to advance the recognition of welfare rights. In both
291. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
292. Id. at 667, quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
293. Id. at 668.
294. Id. at 669.
295. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
296. See Karst, supra note 286, at 26-33; Michelman, Welfare Rights in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659, 679-80 (1979) [hereinafter Welfare Rights]; Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term-Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV.
L. REv. 7, 19-33 (1968) [hereinafter Protecting the Poor].
297. Much of the legal literature discussing the incorporation of egalitarian norms into equal
protection jurisprudence was influenced by the work of J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
See, e.g., Karst, supra note 286, at 6; Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 296, at 670;
Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra note 296, at 15.
298. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
299. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
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cases, the Court found that durational residency requirements for government benefits unduly burdened the "fundamental" right of interstate
travel. As in Harper,the Court was unwilling to permit legislative classi-

fications that adversely affected the poor's ability to exercise certain unwritten rights. These cases3°° could be read to say that once the
government created welfare programs, it lost at least some of its ability to
exercise discretion over the administration of benefits.30 1 In essence, welfare programs, once legislated, became positive entitlements. 30 2

The potential for the achievement of welfare rights was always limited. First, echoing the specter of Lochner, it raised problems of judicial
legitimacy. As Justice Harlan stated in his dissent in Shapiro, "I know of
nothing which entitles this Court to pick out particular human activities,
characterize them as 'fundamental,' and give them added protection

under an unusually stringent equal protection test.

' 30 3

By determinig

that certain nontextual rights were fundamental, the Court was vulnera-

ble to the charge of using equal protection analysis to construe governmental activities in light of the Court's own substantive values. This is
3 4
what the Court had refused to do through due process analysis. 0

Moreover, the recognition of welfare rights raised issues of judicial
competence. In Maricopa, for example, the Court held that a one year

residency requirement for free non-emergency medical care infringed
upon the right to travel. While infringement on travel was remote at best,
the law did deny indigents health care. 3 5 Therefore, Maricopa could be
read as a recognition of a right to medical care,30 6 which raises exceedingly complex questions.30 7 What is medical need? What needs must be
300. For a listing of similar cases, see Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 296, Appendix A,
at 686-93.
301. Id. at 663.
302. Cases recognizing that statutory benefit programs created a property interest triggering
procedural due process protections further bolstered this view. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970).
303. 394 U.S. at 662, (Harlan, J., dissenting).
304. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-31 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1955).
305. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 270-71 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stressing the issues of medical care raised by the case).
306. This is particularly true when Maricopa is considered alongside other cases that upheld
durational residency requirements. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (durational residency requirements for divorce); Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971), aff'g mem., 326 F.Supp. 234 (D.
Minn. 1970) (durational residency requirement for reduced tuition to state schools). The distinction
in Maricopa and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), therefore, appears to be the importance
of the "plus" factor, the welfare benefit at stake. See Michelman, supra note 296, at 662-63.
307. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: A REPORT ON
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satisfied? How shall the right be financed? To many, these questions appear particularly ill-suited for judicial, as opposed to legislative, resolution. 30 8 Thus any recognition of welfare rights threatened to involve the
judiciary in difficult policy issues which, no doubt, seemed all the greater
30 9
during the years of inflation and recession in the 1970s.

Ultimately, however, the acknowledgment of welfare rights was limited by the apparent inconsistency between substantive entitlements and
deeply held political philosophies. 310 The creation of substantive entitlements appeared to clash with the liberal, individualistic ideology predominant in constitutional jurisprudence. It was therefore not surprising
that, with the change of the Court's composition, other cases signaled a
rejection of welfare entitlements.31
In Dandridge v. Williams, 312 for example, plaintiffs challenged a
Maryland policy that set a maximum, cap on AFDC payments regardless
of family size. The Court held that the cap need only be scrutinized by
the rational basis test, because the issue was one of social and economic
regulation.3 13 Undoubtedly influenced by issues of judicial competence
and legitimacy, the Court said that the intractable economic, social, and
philosophical problems posed by public welfare were political, not consititutional questions. This reasoning implied that there is no right to minimal sustenance. Thus to Justice Marshall, in dissent, the majority
THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 18-47

(1983). The literature on the subject of whether there can or should be a right to health care is
voluminous. See, eg., N. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 4-9 (1985); V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE?
HEALTH, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE 132-42 (1974).
308. See Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 296, at 663; Black, supra note 280, at 1113.
Michelman argues that because of the problems ofjudicial competence, the Court must predicate the
recognition of positive rights on the existence of legislatively created entitlement programs. The role
of the Court is to constrain congressional and adminstrative discretion and validate substantive entitlements with respect to legislatively created programs. Id., supra note 296, at 674. Professor Black
points out that many constitutional rights cannot be competently executed by the judiciary. Nevertheless, he argues such rights continue as constitutional rights. Black, supra note 280, at 1113-14.
The problem with both Michelman's and Black's theses is a variation on the old "right without a
remedy" problem: once you concede that rights are dependent on legislative enactments and are not
otherwise enforceable by the judiciary, they are not really constitutional rights.
309. See, e.g., L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES
FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE 155-58 (1980).
310. See Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 296, at 683.
311. The Court has not overruled the precedent and continues to adhere to the view that the
impingement of a fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17, 217 n.15 (1982). The
fundamental rights doctrine, however, has not been allowed to develop into a full and clear recognition of substantive entitlements. See infra notes 318-24 and accompanying text.
312. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
313. Id. at 484-85.
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"emasculated" the equal protection clause, by failing to recognize the
poverty and powerlessness of the plaintiffs.3 a 4
Other cases reaffirmed the lack of substantive constitutional entitlements and indicated that the Constitution was in fact limited to protecting individuals against government coercion.31 5 While upholding parts of
Oregon's summary eviction proceeding in Lindsey v. Normet,31 6 for example, the Court stated:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing.
But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional
guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality, or any recognition
of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond
the term of his lease .... 317
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,a1 8 shows
most clearly the Court's rejection of welfare rights and its adoption of a
narrow, negative view of the Constitution. Plaintiffs claimed that Texas'
reliance on property taxes to finance education violated the equal protection clause because it created a wealth-based classification that infringed
on the fundamental right to an education. Rodriguez involved both a
wealth classification3 19 and an important benefit, education. Despite this
similarity to Shapiro, the Court rejected Shapiro'sapproach. First, it held
that wealth classifications alone never trigger strict scrutiny. 20 Only
314. Id. at 508, 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's use of the term "emasculate"
is interesting because it reveals his own blindness to the underlying issues of gender inherent in the
case.

315. A recent example is Lyng v. Int'l Union United Auto Acreos. & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 108 S.,Ct. 1184 (1988). The Court has not been totally consistent. Cases such as United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (§ 5(b) of the Food Stamp Act creates an
unconstitutional irrebutable presumption) and United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S.

528 (1973) (§ 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act lacks a rational basis) continued to evidence support for
finding substantive welfare rights. More recently, Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), demonstrated
the Court's occasional willingness to use fundamental rights doctrine flexibly to invalidate classifications denying important govermental benefits, such as public education. Id. at 221-22.
316. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
317. Id. at 74. Some state courts have found that their constitutions require the provision of
housing, shelter, and/or education. See, e.g., Burlington County Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of
Colored People v. Mt. Laurel Township., 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (obligations to provide
realistic opportunity for low and moderate income housing); Callahan v. Carey, NYJL Dec. 11,
1979, at 10 col.4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1979) (state constitution requires shelter for the homeless); Serranno v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971) (obligation to provide education).
318. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
319. The Court actually denied that there was any wealth-based classification on the theory that
districts with low property values could not be assumed to be districts with poor individuals. Id. at
23.
320. Id. at 24.
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where wealth is used absolutely to deny any access to a benefit was strict
judicial review mandated.3 2 Second, the Court stated that despite the
undeniable link between education and economic and political power,
education was not a fundamental right, because it was not implicitly or
explicitly granted by the Constitution.3 2 2 Except where the Constitution
or precedent otherwise commanded, the Constitution would not be read
to require rights to the provision of resources or the means to achieve full
citizenship. Thus, the Court saw a clear distinction between positive and
negative rights, and held that only negative rights were constitutionally
mandated. The Court thus refused to construe the equal protection
clause to give special protection to important substantive needs. In essence, the Court failed to uphold claims based on the interdependency of
individuals. Although in some later cases such as Maricopa3 23 the Court
occasionally appeared to uphold a welfare right, since Rodriguez the

Court generally has read the Constitution as essentially a guarantor of
what the Court deems to be negative rights.32 4
B.

The Impact of the Negative Rights Thesis on Gender Equality
The view that the Constitution does not create rights against the

community has major implications for women's equality.325 The most
obvious connection is economic. Because women as a group are economi-

cally disadvantaged,326 the view that the government need not provide
321. Id. at 25 n.60.
322. Id. at 35.
323. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa Co., 415 U.S 250 (1974). The impact of San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), was also limited somewhat by Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982), which held that although education was not a fundamental right, id. at 223, the state
could not deny it completely to undocumented aliens. Stressing the importance of education, id. at
222, the Court struck down the Texas statute using a "rational relationship" test far stricter than the
one typically employed. Id. at 223-30. Although Plyer shares much in common with the earlier
welfare rights cases, and with Brown v. Board. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which it cited at
length, Plyer did not signal a return toward a recognition of positive rights. Indeed, Plyeris in many
ways as much about discrimination against a particular class - undocumented aliens - as it is
about the government's obligation to provide education. 457 U.S. at 218-20. Thus Plyer may be seen
as merely a simple application of the anti-discrimination principle to illegal aliens, and not as a major
shift in the Court's jurisprudence of rights. Moreover, to the extent that Plyer was based on a positive right to an education, it was implicitly narrowed by Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983),
which upheld a bona fide residency requirement for public education. See also Kadrmas v. Dickinson
Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988) (school bus fee is not unconstitutional).
324. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (review of welfare cases is deferential).
325. Similar implications exist for issues of racial equality. A discussion of those issues is beyond the scope of this Article. It should be noted, however, that cases involving welfare rights often
involve underlying issues of both sexism and racism.
326. See supra notes 59-83 and accompanying text.
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welfare benefits, disparately impacts upon women.

Dandridge is a clear example. Since at the time of the decision,
AFDC was available only to single custodial parents (Wvho are usually

mothers), and their dependent children, and in some states, families with
unemployed fathers,327 most recipients were single women and their children. Given the structure of AFDC, the Court's opinion becomes especially telling. The state's decision to place a per family cap on payments
was accepted by the Court as a rational method of encouraging employment.328 But limiting per family rather than per capita grants is more
tailored to restricting family size than to encouraging employment. As
Professor Sunstein has noted, "[q]uite possibly, the statute reflected stere-

otypical conceptions about the poor in general and poor women in particular; that their poverty is a product of sloth, and they breed children

to increase their welfare payments.

32 9

Dandridgereflected an insensitiv-

33 °
ity to the gender bias of the state's policy.
Of equal importance, however, is Dandridge'smessage that women
and not the state are responsible for problems of poverty and family size.
Poor women with children have no claims of entitlement against the
state.33 1 Indeed, just as discrimination law teaches that pregnant women
are not entitled to "special treatment," so, too, Dandridge teaches that

impoverished women with large families are not entitled to additional
benefits. In both Dandridge and the pregnancy cases, the Court sees the

benefits which women need because of their childbearing and childrearing roles as a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional entitlement.

The judicial inability to recognize the societal responsibility for women's economic condition is even more striking in the Supreme Court's
327. See Law, supra note 73, at 1255-56. The blatant sex-bias of the unemployed fathers program, which assumed that only male incomes are critical to a family, was remediable under standard
discrimination theory. The unemployed father program was held unconstitutional in Califano v.
Wescott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979). In some sense, the structure of AFDC can be seen as benefitting
women because it denies coverage to single men. On the other hand, this is a reflection of the assumption made in the 1930s about the inability of single women to support their children. While
these assumptions may have been, and still are, rooted in economic reality, the structuring of the
program that separates AFDC from other benefit programs, such as social security, reinforces the
stigmatization and marginalization of poor women. For an excellent discussion of the patriarchical
foundations of AFDC, see Law, supra note 73, at 1249.
328. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1971).
329. Sunstein, supra note 286, at 73.
330. Undoubtedly the Maryland statute was also influenced by racial stereotypes. See also San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which the Court was blind to the
race discrimination issues underlying the state's policy.
331. See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
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abortion funding cases.332 After the Supreme Court decided Roe v.

Wade, 333 many states covered the cost of elective abortions under the
Medicaid program. 334 As opposition to Roe intensified, several states discontinued coverage of elective abortions. In Maher v. Roe 335 the Court
upheld that practice.
Maher stands as a polemic on the individualistic, liberal presuppositions of constitutional jurisprudence. It also demonstrates the limits of
that jurisprudence for gender discrimination. The Court began its analysis by emphasizing that the Constitution does not create substantive entitlements. "The Constitution imposes no obligation on the states to pay
the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to
pay any of the medical expenses of indigents. ' 336 Nevertheless, the Court
conceded, constitutional limitations must be observed with respect to the
lines drawn by the state in dispensing benefits it has chosen to give.337
The question was whether the state drew the lines in a permissible

fashion.
First, the Court relied on Dandridge and Rodriguez to find that

although the Medicaid limitation affects only indigent women, it is not
constitutionally suspect. 3 38 Second, it found that although Roe v. Wade
declared the right to an abortion to be fundamental, it was a purely nega-

tive right not to have the state unduly burden women's ability to have an
abortion. 339 This right was not impinged by the state's action because:
[A]n indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a
consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth (but not abor332. See Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980);
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (per curiam); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe,
432 U.S. 438 (1977); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
333. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). As this article was going to press, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case which raises the question whether Roe v. Wade was correctly decided. Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 851 F.2d 1071 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted,57 U.S.L.W. 3441, 3442

(Jan. 9, 1989). Any narrowing or overruling of Roe would only reinforce the arguments made
herein.
334. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343, 343-53 (1965) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 139 6-139 6 p (1982), did not require the states to fund nontherapeutic
abortions through the Medicaid program. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 447.
335. 432 U.S. at 464. In Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 430, decided the same day, the Court held that
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 343-353, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396p (1982),
did not require states to fund nontherapeutic abortions through the Medicaid program. 432 U.S. at
447.
336. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 469.
337. Id. at 469-70.
338. Id. at 470-71.
339. Id. at 473-74. For a good discussion of the Court's emphasis on the negative nature of the
right enunciated in Maher v. Roe, see Appleton, supra note 285, at 730.
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tion) .... The indigency that may make it difficult - and in some cases,
perhaps impossible - for some women to have abortionss4 is neither created
nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation. 0

As a result, the state regulation need only be scrutinized under the rational basis test, which it passed as a "rational means of encouraging
34 1
childbirth.
In Harris v. McRae,34 2 the Court reaffirmed and expanded its holding in Maher. McRae involved the federal Hyde amendment, 343 which

prohibited the federal government from paying for Medicaid abortions
except where the life of the woman would be endangered by carrying the
fetus to term, or in cases of rape or incest that had been reported to a law
enforcement or public health agency. 3"

The issues in McRae were even more difficult than those in Maher,
because the Court was faced with the question whether medically neces-

sary abortions could be excluded from the Medicaid program, which usually pays for medical services. With the issue thus framed, the

government's action came perilously close to penalizing a woman for the
exercise of a constitutionally protected choice,3 45 an act proscribed by a
considerable body of precedent.3 46 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the

Hyde amendment, 347 because the government placed no obstacle in the
woman's path, but merely encouraged childbirth, in lieu of abortion.3 4 8
In addition, the Court stated that even if Roe was concerned with a woman's health:
340. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices
Marshall and Blackmun, chided the majority for insensitivity to the plight of the indigent. Id. at 483
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
341. Id. at 479.
342. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
343. The Hyde amendment was attached annually to fiscal appropriations, The version before
the Court in McRae appeared Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926
(1979).
344. 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980). In Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, 369 (1980), the Court ruled
that states need not pay under Medicaid for abortions which were not reimbursed by the federal
government.
345. See Kreimer, AllocationalSanctions: The Problem ofNegative Rights in a Positive State, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1375-76 (1984).
346. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403-06 (1963).
347. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens dissented. Only Justice Stevens voted
with the majority in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and dissented in McRae. His ground for
distinction was that the nontherapeutic abortions at stake in Maher by definition were outside the
scope of Medicaid, while medically necessary abortions were within the scope of the statute. 448 U.S.
at 349-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
348. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.
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[I]t simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries
with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself
of the full range of protected choices. Although government may not place
obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of freedom of choice, it need not
remove those
not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter
349
category.

McRae is a prime example of the view that the Constitution does not
create substantive entitlements. In finding that the Hyde amendment did

not violate the due process clause, the majority stated that any other
holding "would mark a drastic change in our understanding of the Con-

stitution. ' ' 350 The Constitution, the Court said, sets limits on governmental power; it does not require affirmative subsidies for the indigent.3
Thus, after Maher and McRae, the right to an abortion is a purely

negative right to be left alone. 352 Government is under no obligation to
make the right accessible or meaningful. Indeed, government can even

draw classifications in such a way as to "tilt" the choice, by making
childbirth more affordable than abortion.
Maher and McRae reflect an almost primitive liberal view of the

relationship between the individual and the state.3

4

Both assert that the

349. Id. at 316. The Court also held that the Hyde amendment did not violate the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 322. Relying on Maher, the Court found that the amendment did not impinge on a suspect class, id. at 323, and that it served the rational basis of protecting
potential life, id. at 324. In addition, the Court held that the amendment did not violate the religion
clauses of the first amendment. Id. at 319-21.
350. Id. at 318.
351. Id.
352. MacKinnon argues that this limited view follows directly from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), and its view that abortion is a private, voluntary matter. See C. MACKINNON, supra note 1,
at 93-102. The future of even this limited view of abortion rights now appears questionable. See
supra note 333.
353. Although the McRae Court was untroubled by the effect of a government policy encroaching on the right to abortion, in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) the Court
established a more exacting standard for determining the validity of a state's exercise of police powers that might infringe on property rights. In Nollan the Court held that a public access easement to
private beachfront property, imposed as a condition to a rebuilding permit, amounted to a taking
under the fifth amendment. The Court did not discuss whether the easement significantly diminished the value of the property and was unconvinced that the partial or indirect nature of the access
rights amounted to less than a violation of the owner's rights under the fifth amendment.
354. The abortion funding cases have been subject to considerable scholarly criticism. See, e.g.,
Goldstein, A Critique of the Abortion FundingDecisions: On PrivateRights in the Public Sector, 1981
HAsTiNGs CONST. L.Q. 313 (1981) (discussing the anti-choice implications of the abortion funding
cases); Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief
Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113 (1980) (criticizing court's decision as constitutionaly inconsistent with decision in Roe v. Wade); Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum:
Inalienable Rights,Affirmive Duties, and the Dilemna ofDependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 335-40
(1985) (discussing notions of liberty and privacy in abortion cases). Appleton, supra note 285, is in
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woman's indigency is not the result of any state action. 355 Yet, at least

since the Legal Realists, it has been clear that the distribution of re356
sources is partially a function of the legal allocation of property rights.

This is especially true in the case of abortion. To say that women's indigency is prior to the state is to ignore the state's role in supporting dis-

criminatory practices which have kept women from participating fully in
the labor market." 7 Indeed, it ignores the very lessons of those cases
which recognized that centuries of discrimination have led to disparities

in economic opportunites between men and women.358 Further, the
Court is blind to the many subtle ways that the law interacts with the
35 9
structure of the workplace to make women economically dependent.
Indeed, what is so ironic about McRae and Maher is their failure to see

that the inaccessibility of free abortions, combined with a legal system
which does not require employers to grant maternity leaves, child-care
leaves, or a flexible work schedule, creates the very indigency which pre-

vents women from exercising the choice to have an abortion.3 60 As Justice Marshall has noted, the restrictions on Medicaid abortions may well

force a women either to risk an illegal abortion, or to give up all hope of
escaping the cycle of poverty.3 6 t Indeed, after McRae a woman must face
accord with our thesis that the positive/negative rights distinction is critical to understanding these
cases. However, she is less critical of the Court's distinction. Id. at 730-31. State courts have also
been highly critical of Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
See infra note 397.
355. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316-17; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474. Even Justice Brennan's dissent in McRae seemed to accept the validity of that assertion. 448 U.S. at 334 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing medicaid benefits as "governmental largesse" and "governmental
favors").
356. See, e.g., Cohen, Propertyand Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 13-14, 21-26 (1927) (discussing the role of law in protecting property and regulating property acquisition); Hale, Bargaining,
Duress,and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 605-06, 625-28 (1943)(describing the acquisition of property rights through market relationships).
357. See, e.g., WOMEN'S WORK, MEN'S WORK, supra note 43, at 41-46, passim (documenting

institutional and legal factors supporting employment discrimination); Law, supra note 73, at 12861305 (describing how the welfare system and U.S. Department of Labor contribute to sex
discrimination).
358. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 1442 (1987); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 684-86 (1972).
359. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
360. This is especially true in the case of women seeking Medicaid abortions. Other than dependent minors, most women seeking Medicaid abortions are single mothers. See Law, supra note 73, at
1256, 1279. Indeed, the eligibility of single mothers for AFDC represents some recognition by the
legal system that this group is economically disadvantaged precisely because it is comprised of single
mothers. See Law, supra note 73, at 1253-56, 1258-59, 1281.
361. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 458 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also
pointed to the important racial implications of the decision. Id. at 459-60.
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that dilemma even when the pregnancy will not only impose an economic
liability, but also a risk to her health, further jeopardizing her earning
capacity.
The Court's inability to perceive the context of women's financial
dependence recalls the sex discrimination cases. Although the doctrines
are technically distinguishable, both the sex discrimination and abortion
funding cases rely on an abstracted, ahistorical vision. Discrimination
law follows a fault model in order to determine when plaintiffs may be.
treated differently. This inquiry centers upon the invidiousness of the defendant's motives.3 62 Similarly, the abortion funding and other fundamental rights cases rely heavily on the supposed "motives" and
coerciveness of the legislature. Thus, in Dandridgethe Court found the
AFDC cap constitutional because the state could articulate a legitimate
motive.36 3 And in McRae, the Court exonerated the legislature because it
did not "cause" the underlying problem. 3 All of these cases reflect the
decontexualized nature of the inquiry, which sees neither individual defendants, nor the government, as having any responsibility to ensure that
individuals achieve full equality and citizenship.
Other parallels between the fundamental rights and discrimination
doctrines are equally striking. The Court's willingness to view the Hyde
amendment as a decision not to fund abortions, rather than as a penalty
imposed on women who have abortions,36 5 is premised on the assumption that abortions are somehow "different" from other medical services
and can therefore be considered separately for funding purposes. Thus,
McRae echoes Geduldig. Both presume that pregnancy is a "special"
physical condition, and that benefits generally available need not be provided for pregnancy related conditions.3 66 The crucial assumptions are
that pregnancy is a voluntary condition and that the norm is male nonpregnancy. Thus, the same biases and limitations that appear in discrimination law inform fundamental rights analysis.
C.

The Negative Rights Thesis and the Limits of DiscriminationLaw
The negative rights thesis suggests the limits of discrimination law

362. See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
363. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970). This is comparable to the Court's approach in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). See supranotes
241-44 and accompanying text.
364. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980).
365. See id. at 317, n.19.
366. See Appleton, supra note 285, at 749.
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to redress issues of gender inequality. 367 Without a recognition that women's needs arise in the context of discrimination and interdependency,
women will always be subject to the accusation that since their problems
are of their own making, any solutions constitute special or preferential
treatment. As a result, many essential claims of women will remain
unfulfilled.
Any broad attempt to scrutinize the differential allocation of rights
and benefits would thus recognize interdependency and society's obligations to ensure that women have the means for achieving full citizenship.
This would not only run counter to the Court's denial of social responsibility for class and gender subordination, but it would make society an
active provider of individual rights. The very nature of the relationship
between the individual and the state would change.
Neither the similar treatment nor the different treatment theories
can transcend this fundamental problem. The similar treatment approach is deficient in two essential ways. First, as the difference scholars
point out, it cannot claim rights where women are not perceived to be
situated similarly to men. Second, it cannot achieve its goal-genderneutral solutions-because in so doing it runs up against the wall of individualism and the belief in negative rights. Thus, proponents of the similar treatment approach, who believe that the solution to the maternity
leave conundrum is universal parenting leave are short-sighted. Equally
short-sighted are the biological difference scholars who argue that courts
should recognize the gender differences between the sexes and accommodate those differences by establishing maternity leaves.
The fundamental rights cases teach that the legal regime is not
about to establish a constitutional right to either maternity leaves for
women or parenting leaves for both sexes. Current jurisprudence dictates
that in either case there is no constitutionally explicit or implicit right at
stake.368 Of course, the legislature may provide such a right, but it is not
367.

Professor Fox-Genovese argues that individualistic ideology represents a major stumbling

block for the women's movement. See Fox-Genovese, Women's Rights, Affirmative Action and the
Myth of Individualism, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 338 passim (1986). Others have argued even more
broadly that legal rights themselves can never advance equality. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 22 (discussing incoherencies that arise from application of rights theory to sexuality); Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363, 1364-94 (1984) (discussing inherent instability of right of reproductive choice). For a feminist response arguing that rights dialectically interact with political movements, see Schneider, The DialecticofRights and Politics:PerspectivesFrom the Women's Movement,
61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986). In this Article, we do not engage in the debate over the nature or
efficacy of rights in the abstract. We primarily examine the limitations in the current interpretation
of rights i.e., as negative rights.
368. See 410 U.S. at 33.
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required to do so.36 9 After all, the burdens faced by those who cannot

afford the consequences of either losing a job or paying for childcare are
not the government's "fault."

'

The government did not force the indi-

vidual to have a child; nor is it responsible for the lack of parental resources to hire a caregiver.3 7 1 Thus, the failure to provide parenting
leaves does not "impinge" on any rights.37 2 After all, "the Constitution
373
does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill."
Of course, most feminists do not claim a constitutional right to ma-

ternity or parenting leaves. What they advocate are legislative programs.
But even if enacted, such programs are vulnerable both judicially and

politically to the force of the negative rights thesis. Indeed, the thesis is
so powerful in constitutional law precisely because it resonates with

deeply held political visions and intuitions that extend beyond constitutional interpretation.37 4
This is not to say that there are no social welfare programs. Rather,
it is to say that women seeking programs to accommodate their needs are
vulnerable to the charge of being a "special interest group," whether or
not the program advocated is couched in gender neutral terms.37 5 Our
society does not recognize the deep interrelationships between its own
structure and the needs of women seeking substantive rights. Thus, the

history of social welfare legislation primarily affecting women (such as
AFDC), is the history of political vulnerability and increased marginal-

ization.376 Like pregnancy, these programs are not seen as fulfilling the
public interest.37 7
369. See Cal. Fed. 479 U.S. 272 (1987). But, as in that case, such programs may be attacked as
preferential treatment. See infra notes 421-22 and accompanying text.
370. "The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range
of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on
access to abortions, but rather her indigency." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1979).
371. Id. at 314.
372. The identical analysis could be used to establish that an employer is not discriminating
through the failure to provide any such rights.
373. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1971).
374. See Fox-Genovese, supra note 367, passim; Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra note 296, at
659-64. For a study of the individualistic ethos in contemporary America, see R. BELLAH, HABITS
OF THE HEART (1985).
375. For example, Ronald Reagan in 1984 was able successfully to characterize Mondale's advocacy of women's rights as mere catering to special interests. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1984, at Al col.
I.
376. Law discusses how this has been particularly true for women on AFDC. Law, supra note
73, at 1325-28. It is the rare program such as social security old age benefits which can escape that
process. D. MOYNIHAN, supra note 67, at 112-13.
377. Compare veterans' benefits which are considered to promote the public interest. See supra
notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
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The vulnerability of such legislation is exacerbated by a jurisprudence which considers social welfare classifications to be matters of legislative discretion, and upholds them if they are minimally rational.3 7
Thus, while there is good reason and a strong need for feminists to pursue the political process and seek legislative redress for their claims, they
need to recognize that the deep, underlying negative view of government's role that hampers their success in the courtroom will also affect
their success in the legislative arena.
D. The Gender Bias of the Negative Rights Thesis
Thus far we demonstrated how the Court has relied upon a highly
individualistic, abstracted view of rights in both discrimination and welfare rights cases. This narrow, negative vision of women's legal rights
fails to see the social context in which women's claims arise and consequently devalues their experiences. The result is that women's entitlements against society are dismissed as demands for special treatment.
Notwithstanding the Court's limited view of the Constitution in
these areas, the Court in other areas is far more expansive. Indeed, in
many cases the Court has effectively recognized the type of right it rejected in Rodriguez and McRae. In the next two sections we show how
the demarcation between the claims the Court accepts or rejects as positive or negative rights is a contingent one, and how the determination
reached is itself influenced by non-sex neutral norms.
A comparison between Sherbert v. Verner 379 and Wimberly is illustrative. Both involved unemployment compensation claims by individuals unable to work because of the structure of the workplace. In Sherbert
the plaintiff was a Seventh Day Adventist who was unable to secure employment because of her unwillingness to violate her faith by working on
Saturday. As a result, she was deemed "able to work and... available for
work" and thus ineligible for unemployment compensation under state
38 0
law.
The Sherbert Court saw that the denial of unemployment benefits
burdened the exercise of religion. 8 ' The fact that the statute did not expressly discriminate against religion, and that technically plaintiff was
denied benefits because of her inability to work, did not lessen the coer378. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1969).
379. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
380. Id. at 400-01.
381. Id. at 404. This holding was recently reaffirmed in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
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cion on religious liberty.38 2 Nor did the fact that the state had no duty to
provide anyone with unemployment compensation absolve the state of its

obligation to draw lines in a noncoercive manner.383
The Sherbert Court did not hold that the plaintiff was entitled to
special treatment,3 84 which could arguably be viewed as a violation of the
establishment clause. Rather, the Court held that the government could
not penalize the plaintiff. In Wimberly, however, despite FUTA's clear

prohibition against discrimination due to pregnancy, which can be seen
as paralleling the Constitution's explicit protection of the free exercise of

religion, the Court failed to see the coercion inherent in the state scheme
or how the state program adversly impacted on pregnancy. Instead, the

Court charged the plaintiff with seeking a special exception for women. 385 Thus, the special treatment (or establishment) question which
was downplayed in Sherbertbecame dispositive in Wimberly. What treatment is "special" depends on how you look at it.
Clearly, Wimberly was influenced once again by the primacy of the

public sphere ideology and its assumption that women who are pregnant
are unique and can be treated differently. In contrast, religious obser-

vance is not a "peculiarly female" activity. Some accommodations for
religion, particularly those religions which do not deviate much from the
majoritarian faiths,3 86 are not viewed as extraordinary but necessary.
What Wimberly and Sherberttogether show is that what appears as "special treatment" and therefore a violation of the negative rights thesis, is
predicated on deeply held assumptions and values, which are not sexneutral.38 7

The abortion funding cases provide an even more telling example of
382. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 404.
383. Id.
384. Justice Stewart in a concurring opinion saw the holding as requiring special treatment, and
approved of it on that account. He stated "[I] think our Constitution commands the positive protection by government of religious freedom. . ." 374 U.S. at 416 (Stewart, J., concurring).
385. 479 U.S. at 518.
386. Compare and contrast Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise clause protects rights of Amish parents to keep children out of school) with Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986) (free exercise clause does not protect right of a Jewish military officer to wear a
yarmulke).
387. This is not to say that "sexism " explains Sherbert. Rather, it is to say that the importance
and value of religion and religious tolerance is widely recognized and valued, albeit not in all court
cases, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 224 (1972); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). These
activities are traditionally associated with the male or public sphere. Pregnancy and child-rearing are
associated with the private sphere. Accommodations for them in the public sphere are seen as preferential treatment, rather than the lack of coercion.
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the impact of the gender bias behind the Court's categorization of rights

as positive or negative. In Maher and McRae the Court saw the issue as
whether or not a governmental obligation existed to finance abortions. So

framed, the answer clearly was 'no.' There are, however, other ways to
state the issue.
Professor Tribe, for example, sees the right to an abortion as a rela-

tional right of women as a group against the subordination that follows
when any woman lacks control over her reproductive destiny.38 8 Under

this vision, Tribe is able to argue that abortion rights are inalienable because they concern the place of women in society. Therefore abortion
rights, like suffrage, cannot be predicated on financial resources.38 9
Although few jurists have gone as far as Tribe in portraying the right to
an abortion in non-individualistic terms, 390 many have found the Hyde

amendment or similar state laws to infringe on the negative right to an
abortion.3 9 '
For Justice Brennan, Congress' decision to fund one potential out-

come of pregnancy-childbirth-while not funding another potential
outcome, abortion, is critical. 392 By not treating the two outcomes
equally, Brennan argues, the state has effectively coerced the indigent
woman into choosing childbirth 393 and has made "an offer that' the indi388. See Tribe, supra note 354, at 335-36.
389. Id. at 334-38.
390. Cf.Fox-Genovese, supra note 367, at 372 (feminists have espoused the right to an abortion
in radically individualistic terms, which is in contradiction to feminists' calls for affirmative action
and comparable worth).
391. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 329 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (opinion joined
by Justices Marshall and Blackmun); id. at 337 (Marshall, J.,dissenting); id. at 348 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Since Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and JkcRae were decided, most state courts
that have faced the issue have held that state laws denying Medicaid abortions when medically
necessary violate various provisions of their state constitutions. See Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. 394, 515
A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982);
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal.3d 252, 625 P. 2d 779 (1981), 172 Cal.
Rptr. 866; Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981); Planned Parenthood
Ass'n. v. Dep't. of Human Resources, 63 Or. App. 41, 663 P.2d 1247 (1983). But see Fischer v.
Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985) (state restriction on abortion funding does not
violate constitution).
392. Harris v. McRae 448 U.S. at 332-33 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
393. Id. at 333-34. The problem with Brennan's analysis is his acceptance of the proposition
that the state has no prior obligation to fund either abortion or childbirth. Id. at 330. Were the state
to take that position, indigent women would certainly be worse off than they are under the Hyde
amendment. This is not to say that the majority was correct in its formalistic assertion that the
greater power implies the lesser. Rather, it demonstrates the relational and contextual nature of the
problem, and the fact that the need for abortion funding cannot be severed from the overarching
need for economic support for childbearing activities. See Tribe, supra note 354, at 34143.

1987]

THE FAILURE OF GENDER EQUALITY

gent woman cannot afford to refuse."3'94 Thus, to Brennan, the Hyde
amendment is both coercive and discriminatory as between childbirth
and abortion.3 95 As a result, the amendment violates the right of privacy
because it impinges the exercise of free choice.39 6 Many state courts have
followed Brennan's approach in analyzing abortion funding restrictions
under their own state constitutions.3 97
This approach demonstrates the malleability of the Court's approach. Once one recognizes that government can impinge upon individ-

ual liberty by withholding valuable benefits, the distinction between
negative rights against governmental coercion and positive rights to ben-

efits becomes manipulable. The principle that liberal government has no
prior obligations to its citizens 398 loses much of its force once we recognize that benefit programs do exist, and must comply with constitutionally sound distinctions.39 9 The world we live in is not purely libertarian

and laissez-faire (indeed, there could be no such world), but rather one in
which there is an active government and more than a semblance of a
welfare state. Thus, most cases claiming that benefit programs are not

structured in an equal fashion, or that institutions are constituted in an
unequal way, can be subject to the type of analysis used by Justice Brennan in his McRae dissent.'
Similarly, the fluidity of the positive/negative distinction is apparent in Dandridge,4" which the Court viewed as
involving a claim for positive welfare rights. This claim can of course be

viewed equally as a claim for negative privacy rights, that is, a claim
394. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
395. Id.
396. Id. at 334-35. Many other governmental actions that condition benefits on the exercise of
certain choices have been found unconstitutional. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
For a general discussion of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, and how it was misapplied in
McRae, see Kreimer, supra note 345, at 1340-77.
397. E.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779,
781, 786-98, 172 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1981); Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. 344, 515 A.2d 134, 155-62 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1986); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925, 934-37 (1982). In his separate opinion in Right to Choose v. Byrne, Justice Pashman went so far as to argue that there was a
fundamental right to health care violated by the denial of medicaid abortions. 450 A.2d at 941 n.1.
398. Eg., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). Some state courts have explicitly rejected
this premise as in conflict with their state constitutions. See, e.g., Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7
(1977) (assistance to the needy is mandated by Article XVII, § I of New York State Constitution).
399. E.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 252-53; United States Dep't. of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 528-38 (1973).
400. See supra notes 395-99. This is similar to the analysis used in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969), and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See supra text and
accompanying notes 291-304. In addition, of course, classifications drawn by welfare agencies remain subject to attack as a violation of authorizing statutes.
401. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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against governmental interference with decisions about family size. The
interesting question is why the Court chooses to eiercise its power to
denominate rights as negative in some cases and not in others.
There is no fully satisfactory answer. Some of the inconsistencies in
the caselaw are no doubt due in large part to the changing composition of
the Court, the changing political climate in the nation, and the fears of
judicial illegitimacy and manageability. In addition, the choices the
Court makes coincide, to a large degree, with deep-seated intuitive beliefs
about baseline norms of society. And these norms, in turn, reflect the
underlying public sphere ideology of the nature of rights and obligations.
Thus the universality of this ideology causes difficulties not only for discrimination law, but also for a fuller vision of rights.
For example, the issues at stake in a decision to abort are seldom
purely individualistic. Rather, a woman is often faced with concerns not
only for herself, but for her other children and family.4"2 But the Court's
individualistic stance blinds it to the relationships involved in the decision. Moreover, the Court fails to see that the control over procreation
affects the status and citizenship of all women." Unless all women have
that power, their subordination and dependency is perpetuated. 4" In addition, the problems faced by pregnant poor women stem in large part
from the legal and institutional structures which have kept women financially dependent. Thus, the Court's analysis derives from its inability to
see the interdependency between indigent women and society.
The hidden assumptions in the abortion funding cases reflect more
than a mere insensitivity to the problems faced by poor women. Like
Geduldig and Wimberly, they are evidence that the baseline assumptions
the Court (and, to a large degree, society) make about the obligations
among individuals reflect a model predicated on the images of white,
middle-class males." The image of the individual as autonomous, and as
wielding procreative rights only against the state, is an image reflecting
the male experience. For most women, for whom sexuality itself has tra402. This issue is particularly significant in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) which concerned medically necessary abortions for women on medicaid, many of whom will have had children
prior to the pregnancy at issue. If the woman's health is jeopardized by the pregnancy, that may well
affect her ability to care for her other children.
403. See Law, supra note 2, at 981; Tribe, supra note 354, at 335-40.
404. This is not to say that the decision is therefore primarily a collectivistic one, in conflict with
the privacy right decreed in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Fox-Genovese, supra note 367, at
370.
405. See Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 503 (1987)
("The debate over 'positive' and 'negative' rights also depends on the choice of baselines"); see also
infra text accompanying note 412.
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ditionally been an experience of dependency," 6 the notion of a self-sufficient individual independently exercising her right to an abortion is
terribly incomplete. The interrelationship among reproduction, economic
dependence, morality, and private sphere values is far more complex
than the Court comprehends. Yet, the decision about an affirmative right
or, indeed, any right to an abortion, has been based on the underlying
notion that individuals are self-sufficient and autonomous in that regard.
Many feminists, perhaps for strategic reasons, have made the same
error as the Court and have asserted that the right to an abortion is a
private, negative right. 4 7 On the other hand, opponents of abortion take
what at first glance appears to be a relational approach, emphasizing the
woman's responsibility to the fetus and the primacy of public morality." 8
Both sides fail to recognize the critical point; women and society are not
in an adversarial relationship. Women's right to abortion is hollow without a recognition of society's obligation to provide for both procreational
control and childrearing. More generally, women cannot be fully equal
citizens unless their interdependency with the rest of society is recognized. At the same time, society and its children are impoverished by the
disempowerment of women. Thus, equality requires both the independence and the interdependence of women and society. As the abortion
cases show, however, reliance on the ideology of the public sphere and its
distorted emphasis on independence makes equality for women
impossible.
E. The Rights of the Public Sphere
The influence of this ideology explains the lack of positive entitlements to private sphere needs such as medical care," 9 housing, 410 and
personal income. 4 1' These are the "goods" that are most central to women's concerns. Yet, under public sphere ideology, despite their undeniable necessity, society feels no obligation to provide for these needs.
Whatever is offered is mere privilege.
406.

C. MACKINNON, supra note 1 at 36; Olsen, supra note 46, at 1574-75.

407. See, eg., G.

STEINEM, OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AND EVERYDAY REBELLIONS

308 (1983); B.

326 (1981). Law and Fox-Genovese make the same criticism. FoxGenovese, supra note 367, at 372-73; Law, supra note 2, at 1018-19.
408. See, e.g., S. KRASON, ABORTION, POLITICS, MORALITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 457-63
(1984); Rue, The FamilialContext ofInduced Abortion, in RESTORING THE RIGHT TO LIFE 108-09
(1984).
409. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
410. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
411. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-87 (1970).
FRIEDAN, THE SECOND STAGE
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On the other hand, as Sherbert illustrates, the law does sometimes

recognize a broader vision of rights, in which society is obligated to accommodate the needs of individuals. Rights of access to the legal system

are a prime example. In several cases, the Court has found a substantive
entitlement to at least minimal access to the courts.41 2 In part this reflects
the centrality of the legal process itself in our system. Access to suffrage
is another example.4 13 The question arises, why are these rights recognized by a legal system which often rejects claims for social entitlements?

The Court justifies its decisions on the theory that voting and legal
representation are preservative of other rights.4 14 But, of course, as dissenters have pointed out, there are other goods which are necessary to
preserving freedom. 4 15 What distinguishes voting and legal access from

these goods is their connection to the public sphere. Access to them,
therefore, is access to the world of men.
In addition, both rights to the court system and to suffrage are pro-

cess rights. They do not require taking diversity or "special" needs into
account. Nor do they threaten the apparent distinctions between the pub-

lic and private spheres. They are consistent with formalistic notions of
equality.
As in the case of discrimination law, the Court is elevating concerns
for process over substantive result.4 1 6 Process rights are seen as critical
412. Eg., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (requirements for payments of court fees
and costs to'obtain a divorce are unconstitutional); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(indigent criminal defendants must be provided with counsel); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(indigent criminal appellants must be provided with free trial transcript). Cf Lassiter v. Dep't. of
Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (failure to appoint counsel for indigent parents in proceeding for
termination of parental status not a due process violation).
413. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). But see Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) and Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973) (upholding state laws imposing property requirements for eligibility to vote for directors of water district).
414. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. at 667; see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971).
415. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Education is a good that certainly falls in that category. The Court has effectively made
education a quasi-positive right. Rodriguez held that it was not a fundamental right, but suggested
that the state was required to provide a minimal amount of education. Id. at 24. Plyer v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982), repeated that education was not a fundamental right, but nevertheless held that it
was a right entitled to greater judicial protection than other social welfare programs. Id. at 221. Thus
in Plyer, the Court scrutinized the state statute denying illegal aliens public education with more
rigor than usual under the rational basis test. Id. at 226-28.
416. See supra text accompanying notes 238-52.
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'
because they ensure a "level playing field," 417
and thus give each citizen
the "equal opportunity" to compete in the public sphere. The equal opportunity that is achieved, however, exists-if at all-only in the abstract. The emphasis on process therefore is formalistic and decontextual.
It reflects the individualistic, competitive, rights-based ethos associated
with the public sphere ideology. It stands in stark contrast to the relational, interdependent and highly contextualized world associated with
the private sphere. Thus the rights we recognize are due in part to a nongender neutral value system.
Rights that coincide with individualistic notions of equal access and
fair procedures are not perceived as special rights, but as rights necessary
to prevent coercion or unfair advantage. While such rights also apply to
women, they do not address the burdens and disadvantages of women's
lives. Yet, other rights are denied to women because their claims are seen
as affording preferential treatment for private concerns, and thereby expanding the role of government into the private realm. Thus we have no
access rights to childcare, medical or nursing care. Finding such rights
sounds constitutionally dissonant and therefore judicially illegitimate. Indeed, such rights seem so foreign that their recognition appears to be
unmanageable. The result is that we see such rights as demands for substantive entitlements contrary to a liberal society.
Thus the dilemma: discrimination law cannot achieve gender equality because to do so violates the negative rights thesis, but the negative
rights thesis is itself a product of non-sex neutral norms. Thus the issues
and problems under both discrimination law and fundamental rights law
are the same. Each strand of constitutional discourse reinforces the perception that what women claim is beyond the reach of the law. Thus,
feminist claims are dissonant, and somehow beyond the scope of our
jurisprudence.

V.

CONCLUSION

The way out of the conundrum impeding gender equality is difficult
to locate. We can postulate clever doctrinal models to establish a right to
this or that to benefit women, but all such arguments will have little impact. All will appear to demand some special, substantive entitlement
from government, to which no one is entitled.
As we have shown, discrimination law fails to provide any but the
417.

This is one of the assumptions that underlies Ely's representation-reinforcing theory of
DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST (1980), passim.

judicial review. J. ELY,
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most narrow and interstitial of remedies. It cannot address the structual
inequities of the labor market that make rights of equal access hollow for
women struggling to fulfill familial obligations. Nor can it provide the
broadened vision of social entitlements or affirmative obligations necessary for achieving gender equality.
Moreover, the same shortcomings impede constitutional jurisprudence, which perceives a distinction between positive and negative rights,
and dismisses the social, particularly economic, entitlements necessary
for gender equality as improper claims for positive rights. Thus, neither
doctrine can recognize the interdependency of public and private life that
is critical for gender equality.
Ultimately, the problem lies not so much with any single legal doctrine, but with the ways in which legal doctrine itself is formulated.4 18 In
discrimination law, it is the abstraction and denial of the historical and
social context of cases that blinds the Court to the sex-biased results that
derive from supposedly sex-neutral rules. The same method of reasoning
is employed to the same end in the fundamental rights cases. The manipulation of both doctrines obscures the Court's inability to recognize the
non-sex neutral baseline assumptions behind the Court's analysis. In
both doctrines, the concern for process, for formal rules, and for clearly
delineated rights takes precedence over an understanding of the realworld context in which cases arise.4 19
The indictment is more than a charge of excessive formalism. It is,
instead, a criticism of doctrines that view equality and the need to decide
similar cases similarly from far too limited a perspective. Some scholars
have argued that a feminist perspective would broaden and expand these
narrow horizons.42 It would infuse into the Court's vision an appreciation of the relational, non-individualistic aspects of legal problems.4 2 1
Such an additional perspective would certainly have changed the Court's
analysis in the pregnancy and abortion funding cases.
418. Others have also made the charge that legal doctrine cannot be neutral. See, e.g., D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1740-62, 1776-78
(1976).
419. See Finley, Book Review, supra note 57, at 914-23; Scales, supra note 54, at 1380.
420. See Karst, supra note 245, at 486-96; Sherry, supra note 277, at 615. Our approach is
influenced by Professor Scales who argues that merely "incorporating" the feminist or feminine
perspective into our current notion of rights is inadequate. Scales, supra note 54, at 1382. She argues
that feminism reveals the need radically to alter our jurisprudential priorities and stress facts over
rules. Id. at 1388. She sees a feminist jurisprudence as emphasizing differentiation. Id. at 1387. We
depart from her, however, when she turns to a psychoanalytically-based model. See Minow, The
Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 passim (1987).
421. See Karst, supra note 245, at 494-95; Sherry, supra note 277, at 581-82.
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But meaningful equality requires more than an appreciation of the
ways in which individual lives are intertwined. Ultimately, the very process of assuming that the starting point is level, and that the goal is neutral rules, guarantees unequal results. The process of abstraction ensures
that individuals will be measured against a single norm, and that those
whose life circumstances vary from that norm will be judged harshly.4 22
Moreover, because that very process of abstraction is influenced by the
ideology of the public sphere, women are likely to find their claims unmet both by the norms underlying the process and by the very methodology itself. Thus, if gender equality is ever to be realized, if women are
ever to achieve status and respect as citizens who are valued for what
they are, we must recognize that the task of deciding where there is discrimination, and when society owes substantive rights, is far more complex, and far less susceptible to easy formulations than the doctrine has
heretofore allowed. The law must begin to see that individuals stand
before courts and legislatures in different circumstances which cannot be
ignored if equality is to result.4 23 In essence, the courts must be open to
the social context in which cases arise.
An understanding of the context in which cases arise would move
doctrine away from its focus on abstraction, and individualized fault, and
toward a recognition of interdependency and interrelatedness. Courts
would begin to see that equality and full citizenship for women involve
far more than mere rights of access to the public realms from which they
were once excluded. It involves a recognition of and remedy for their
economic vulnerability and, more fundamentally, a validation of the experiences and values that arise from the role of nurturer.4 24 So, too, it
must reject stereotyping and recognize the many differences among
women.
The call for an equality that is grounded in social context and a
respect for the fact that women lead different lives than men is not a
prescription for a single blueprint for reform. Indeed, the formulation of
any simple model would perpetuate the very processes of reasoning
which now impede meaningful equality. Any model that attempted to be
overreaching would necessarily obscure the many differences among women, and thereby threaten a return to stereotyping. Indeed, such a model
would inevitably rely on abstractions (albeit a different system of abstractions from that now in place), thus creating a new hierarchy of values
422. Finley, supra note 2, at 1153.
423. Finley, supra note 57, at 943.
424. See supra text accompanying notes 55-107.
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and rights. Again, the context would disappear and we would lose sight
of how to achieve equality for real individuals, facing experiences and
dilemmas both unique to them and interconnected with society.
The result of a more multifaceted or contextual approach to equality
may at first glance appear to be discordant with traditional ideals of justice. After all, it would not attempt to develop rules that cross-cut factual
contexts. Nor would it provide outcome determinative formulas. It
would instead attempt to recognize the context in which claims arise, and
in such a setting strive as best as possible to promote goals such as independence, interdependence, and diversity, which are crucial to ensuring
full citizenship for all individuals and an end to subordination.
The charge against such an approach is that it 'invites excessive judicial discretion and bias. The charge is not specious, but must itself be
taken in context for the regime we now have is not one of neutral
rules.42 5 On the contrary, it is a regime of rules that support male values
and perpetuate institutional arrangements which have subordinated women. Thus, a move to a more contextualized understanding will not add
to the power or function of the courts. It will only change the nature of
the inquiry, hopefully to one which, by its actual process, does not discount the very real social and biological lives experienced by over one
half of the human race.

425. This is a central teaching of both the legal realists and the critical legal studies scholars. See
R. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 281 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).

